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 Not perhaps since the 1910 Mexican Revolution have 
conditions of violence and criminality in Mexico so preoccupied the 
United States. Pages of US newspapers fill almost daily with graphic 
accounts of horrific crimes throughout Mexico, each more gruesome 
than the other: decapitations, execution-style mass murders, corpses 
in barrels of lye.1 Official US governmental accounts attribute these 
acts variously to escalating warfare among drug cartels, a militarized 
response by the Mexican government to drug-cartel violence, and 
corruption.2 In its most sensational depiction, Mexico has been 

1. Since 2008, the Los Angeles Times has produced a series covering the “savage 
struggle” and violence associated with Mexican drug cartels. See Mexico Under Siege: The 
Drug War at Our Doorstep, L.A. TIMES, http://projects.latimes.com/mexico-drug-war/#/its-a-
war (last visited Nov. 25, 2014); see also Richard Marosi, Mexico under Siege, Mystery Man 
Blamed for Gruesome Tijuana Deaths, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/
world/la-fg-tijuanadruglord18-2008dec18-story.html#page=2; Mark Lacey, With Force, 
Mexican Drug Cartels Get Their Way, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/03/01/world/americas/01juarez.html; James C. McKinley, Jr., Mexican Investigator of 
American’s Killing Is Beheaded, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A29; Mexico: State Legislator 
Hacked to Death During an Interview, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, at A8. 
2. Paul Richter & Ken Dilanian, Clinton Says Mexico Drug Wars Starting to Look like 
Insurgency, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/09/world/la-fg-
mexico-insurgency-20100909; Adam Entous & Nathan Hodge, U.S. Sees Heightened Threat 
in Mexico, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703960004575482080017955838; Clinton: U.S. Can Do More to Help 
Mexico Fight Drug Cartels, CNN (Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/
10/16/clinton.drug.cartels/index.html?hpt=T1; Secretary Napolitano and Mexican 
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portrayed as a lawless country; violence has been represented as a 
full-scale drug war at our “doorstep.”3 Most recently, the crisis of 
arriving Central American children has been attributed to Mexico’s 
“very porous border,” its “smuggling corridors,”4 and the “widespread 
and well-documented involvement of Mexican authorities with 
human smugglers and organized crime.”5 
 Accounts of Mexico have become familiar and formulaic.  
Any totalizing characterization that serves to flatten the Mexican 
landscape is not only inaccurate, but suggests a type of “Mexico-
bashing” that finds sustenance into the dark interior of American 
nativism and xenophobia.  Reports of the threat posed by drug-related 
violence to national security, fear for public safety posed by Mexican 
migration, and the depiction of the country as a pathway for human 
trafficking have assumed distorted proportions.6 Certainly, the death 
toll, fear, and suffering have sharply risen since the Mexican 
government militarized its response to drug cartel violence.7 As a 
matter of geography, the tens of thousands of Central Americans 
fleeing gang-related violence born of failed drug-war policies, trade 
agreements, and corruption, travel the same corridors that traffickers 
often use to supply the drugs to meet an almost insatiable demand in 
the United States. In fact, the crime rate in most of Mexico is 
unexceptional and the overall murder rate is lower than other 

Counterparts Sign Arrangements to Bolster Bilateral Border and Aviation Security, DEPT. 
HOMELAND SECURITY (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/
pr_1269400206038.shtm. 
3. See Mexico Under Siege, supra note 1. 
4. Marv Knox, Sen. Cornyn: Refugee Influx Demands Broad Response, (June 30, 2014), 
https://www.baptiststandard.com/news/texas/16650-influx-of-refugee-children-demands-
broad-response-cornyn-insists.   
5. Jo Tuckman, ‘Flee or Die’: Violence Drives Central America’s Child Migrants to US 
Border, THE GUARDIAN (July 9, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/09/
central-america-child-migrants-us-border-crisis (noting that during Congressional hearings, the 
House Homeland Security Committee Chairman blamed the crisis of arriving children on 
Mexico for not sealing its borders); Maureen Meyer &  Clay Boggs, The Other Crisis: Abuses 
Against Children and Other Migrants Traveling through Mexico, WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN 
AM. (June 27, 2014), http://www.wola.org/commentary/the_other_crisis.  
6. James Ron & Emilie Hafner-Burton, The Latin Bias: Regions, the Western 
Media and Human Rights, 221 CIDE 1, 1 (Nov. 2011), available at http://
www.libreriacide.c6om/librospdf/DTEI-221.pdf (describing and naming the “Latin Bias” in 
media coverage of abuses that take place in Latin America). 
7. See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41349, U.S.-MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND 
BEYOND 29 (2014), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf. 
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countries in the region, and similar to the United States.8 Moreover, 
the crime rate generally throughout the country has declined.9   
 Mindful of the consequences of the distortions and the 
misinformation that leads to the misrepresentation of a people, 
Mexican civil rights groups have attempted to provide a more 
nuanced view of conditions in Mexico.10 Paradoxically, US officials 
repeatedly state that the border is presently as secure as it has ever 
been.11 FBI reports and recent data indicate that accounts of “spillover 
violence” are unfounded.12 The United States describes the Mexican 
government as cooperative and working to “‘prioritize the safe and 
humane treatment of individuals’” who are deported to Mexico.13 

8. Comparing Mexican States With Equivalent Countries: Murderous Matches, THE 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 22, 2012), http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/11/ 
comparing-mexican-states-equivalent-countries; Who is Behind Mexico’s Drug Related 
Violence?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-latin-america-
10681249. 
9. Damien Cave, Homicides Decline Near Border, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 
2014, at A9; Damien Cave, Ciudad Juárez, a Border City Known for Killing, Gets Back to 
Living, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2013, at A6.  
10. For example, Mexico City has a lower homicide rate than many American cities.  See 
Dolia Estevez, Despite Violence in Parts of Mexico, Mexico City Remains Safe for Americans, 
FORBES (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2014/01/14/despite-
violence-in-most-of-mexico-mexico-city-remains-safe-for-americans/; Andrew O’Reilly, Drug 
War Continues But Most of Mexico is Safe for Travel and Business, Experts Say, FOX NEWS 
LATINO (Nov. 25, 2013), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/lifestyle/2013/11/25/despite-drug-
violence-mexico-safe-for-visitors-and-business-experts-say/; THE TRUTH ABOUT MEXICO, 
http://www.thetruthaboutmexico.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2014). 
11. Editorial, Border News, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2010, at WK7; Randal C. Archibold, 
Obama to Send Up to 1,200 Troops to Border, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2010, at A1;  Randal C. 
Archibold, On Border Violence, Truth Pales Compared to Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010, 
at A16; Martha Mendoza, Government Study Finds U.S. Side of Mexico Border Area Low on 
Violent Crime, THE DALLAS NEWS (June 4, 2010),  http://www.dallasnews.com/
sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/DN-border_04int.ART.State.Edition2.294bf61.html 
(quoting a US Customs and Border Protection spokesman noting that the border is safer now 
than ever); AIDING INSECURITY: FOUR YEARS OF MEXICO’S DRUG WAR AND MERIDA 
INITIATIVE, CTR. FOR INT’L POL’Y, (July 1, 2011), https://sites.google.com/site/
transborderproject/transborder-policy-report (reporting that so-called spill-over violence is a 
myth). 
12. Michele Waslin, U.S-Mexico Border Residents Not Surprised by Falling Crime Stats, 
IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR. (July 19, 2011), http://immigrationimpact.com/2011/07/19/u-s-
mexico-border-residents-not-surprised-by-falling-crime-stats/ (referencing a study compiled 
by USA Today).  
13. See Nick Miroff, Mexicali has Become Mexico’s City of the Deported as U.S. Dumps 
More People There, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/the_americas/mexicali-has-become-mexicos-city-of-the-deported-as-us-dumps-more-
people-there/2014/01/16/c5f037ba-68fa-11e3-997b-9213b17dac97_story.html (describing the 
US’ defense of its increased rate of deportation to Mexico, noting that officials “work[ ] in 
close and careful coordination with the Mexican government”).  
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This is not to minimize the violence that has cost Mexicans dearly.  
Rather, the seriousness of the situation requires an analysis of the 
drug-related violence that goes beyond the sensationalist descriptions 
which may chronicle the current turmoil but reveals little about the 
political and socio-economic circumstances that give rise to the 
conditions of a drug war and to the “Mexican-as-criminal” narrative 
that pervades social relations and legal constructions in the United 
States.14   
 The construct of the Mexican as a menace is not new. It is 
possessed of a proper history with origins in the nineteenth century.15 
Mexicans have been described as “‘earless and heartless creatures,’ 
‘semi-barbarians,’ who were ‘only interested in satisfying their 
animal wants’”16 and as “uneducated and grossly ignorant, highly 
excitable, and given to spasmodic outbursts of passion, outlawry and 
violence.”17 They have been lynched for being “‘too Mexican,’” and 
harassed for speaking their native language or otherwise expressing 
their culture.18 They have long been considered the “prototypical 
illegal alien.”19  
The discourse has served to rationalize social and legal policies 
and practices of exclusion. However, it is important to note that the 
master narrative of Mexican criminality has also been adopted by 
well-meaning legal advocates who have availed themselves of the 
drug violence narrative for humanitarian purposes and deployed to 
enhance an immigrant’s chance of remaining lawfully in the United 
States through various forms of immigration relief.20 Still others have 
used the specter of drug cartel violence to advocate for reformed, 
humane drug laws throughout the hemisphere.21 

14. For a summary overview of the political economic determinants of Mexico’s drug-
related violence, see Deborah M. Weissman, Remaking Mexico: Law Reform as Foreign 
Policy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1471 (2014).  
15. Yolanda Vazquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral 
Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 
HOW. L.J. 639, 645 (2011) (describing a history that included lynching); BILL ONG HING, 
DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 115 (2004). 
16. Vazquez, supra note 15, at 645-46. 
17. Henry Clews, The Mexican Situation, 54 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 162 
(1914). 
18. Vazquez, supra note 15, at 645, 649-50. 
19. See Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 75, 106-07 
(2013). 
20. See infra Part III.A. 
21. See generally Ethan Nadelmann, Fund Drug Treatment Rather Than Mexican Anti-
Drugs Operations, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 29, 2007, 4:00AM), http://www.sfgate.com/
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New narratives about Mexico have recently emerged, however 
tentatively, that warrant examination: the Obama administration has 
recast Mexico as a strong and vibrant economic partner to the United 
States. Business groups and their supporters in Congress have once 
again extolled the virtues of the laboring Mexican worker and 
government officials acting on behalf of US oil interests praise 
Mexico’s “ambitious reforms to make [the Mexican] economy more 
competitive.”22 Recent scholarship, also, has offered a more balanced 
description of the skill level and expertise that Mexican workers bring 
to the US workplace, countering the dominant narrative of the 
“criminal alien” and debunking the myth of the ubiquitous unskilled 
Mexican worker. New research serves to document the constructive 
transformation Mexican workers have accomplished in the labor 
market for all workers and the benefits that Mexican entrepreneurship 
brings to local communities.23 
Insofar as narratives are formed as socially-constructed and 
culturally-contingent artifacts, they provide insight into a larger 
“truths” about US-Mexico relations. Narratives are not only an 
expression of social attitudes and nativist sentiments. They also 
develop in tandem with and within the law and legal discourse. They 
are both cause and consequence of a public mood. 
This Article seeks to contribute to the scholarship that has 
examined the way that Latin Americans in general and Mexicans in 
particular have been subordinated through narratives in ways that bear 
on public policy, national interest, and law. It demonstrates that the 
discourse has implications that extend beyond US borders into 
Mexico while reaching deep into local neighborhoods and towns in 
the United States. It then considers whether alternative uses of the 
narratives and newly emerging characterizations are sufficiently 
disruptive of dominant discursive devices used to subordinate 
Mexicans.24     

opinion/article/Fund-drug-treatment-rather-than-Mexican-3301949.php; Matthew S. Jenner, 
International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem With a Domestic Solution, 18 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 90 (2011). 
22. Laura Carlsen, Obama Downplays Drug War, Recasts Mexico, Central America as 
Economic Allies, AMERICA’S PROGRAM (May 30, 2013), http://www.cipamericas.org/
archives/9600. 
23. See infra Part II.B. 
24. See Michael D. Shear & Randal C. Archibold, In Latin America, U.S. Focus Shifts 
From Drug War to Economy, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2013, at A10 (describing a shift in US 
focus). 
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 Part I examines the construction of the prevailing political 
narrative of the Mexican-as-criminal at the transnational, national, 
and local level. It considers how the discursive uses of such 
stereotypes act to construct law that is, in turn, constitutive of the 
narrative. At the transnational, national, and state and local level, 
legal developments respond to and reinforce the construction of the 
Mexican as super-predator with dire consequences for communities 
on both sides of the border. At the transnational level, Mexicans 
perceived to be a danger to the United States are inscribed into the 
larger national angst of terrorism to which transnational policing in 
the form of a military response is deemed necessary. At the national 
level, the depiction of the criminal Mexican immigrant contributes to 
xenophobic excesses and is exploited as political scapegoating and 
often serves to divert attention away from the material reality of the 
political economic circumstances of migration that might otherwise 
inform immigration reform.25 At the state and local level, particularly 
in communities with histories of nativist sentiments and racial 
animus, the depiction of the Mexican criminal in their midst, in their 
schools, on their roads, and at their worksites, is used to justify 
policies of exclusion and community stratification.26 Racist 
tendencies are refueled and reinvigorated as a matter of social 
practices, particularly in the South.27   
Part II then considers alternative uses of the dominant narrative 
of Mexico and Mexicans. It reviews the Mexican-as-criminal 
narrative as used by well-meaning immigration advocates who 
discern in the discourse of Mexico as a nation of criminality and 
lawlessness as a means to assist Mexican immigrants who wish to 
remain in the United States via asylum claims and other immigration 
remedies that require a showing of hardship upon returning.28 It then 
examines contesting narratives and shifting paradigms: from 
“Mexican-as-criminal” (bad neighbor) to “Mexican-as-economic 
partner” (good neighbor)—articulated either as a means to maintain 
US dominance in the economic affairs in Mexico or as a remedial 

25. See infra Part I.B. 
26. See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON & BERNARD TRUJILLO, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER: SÍ, SE PUEDE? (2011).  
27. See infra Part I.C.  
28. See infra Part II.A. 
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description that more accurately depicts changes effected by Mexican 
immigration.29   
Narratives serve a purpose that can be discerned through an 
examination of the social circumstances in which specific discourses 
flourish. They are best understood when analyzed in the context of the 
political economic goals they seek to achieve, and by ascertaining 
who benefits and who is harmed.30 This Article concludes by 
suggesting the need to reexamine narratives in order to determine who 
benefits and who is harmed, and ultimately whether the narrative 
produces a usable framework to understanding and resolving the 
political economic structures that produce violence in Mexico.   
I. NARRATIVES AT WORK:  THE MEXICAN-AS-CRIMINAL 
 Narratives often function in the realm of contingency, as a 
matter of national interests and security requirements, shaped through 
the interaction of foreign policy needs with domestic political 
requirements. The current “Mexican-as-criminal” narrative provides a 
discursive framework with which to shape the rationale of a foreign 
policy designed to expand US economic interests, even as it provides 
local power contenders the rhetoric to exploit racist attitudes and 
nativist sentiment for political ends. Indeed, control of the drug cartel 
violence discourse is critical to regulation of trade, labor, drug policy, 
gun control, immigration, and politics at all levels.31   

29. See infra Part II.B. 
30. Some scholars point out that solidarity/activists groups have contributed to this 
phenomenon by frequent use of graphic depictions of violence as a means to call attention to 
the crisis in Mexico.  See Claire F. Fox, Left Sensationalists at the Transnational Crime Scene, 
in WORLD BANK LITERATURE 184 (Amitava Kumar ed., 2003); see also Andria D. Timmer, 
Constructing the “Needy Subject”: NGO Discourses of Roma Need, 33 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL 
ANTHROP. REV. 264 (2010). 
31. Laura Carlsen, New NSA Mexico Leaks Raise Questions on U.S. Security Programs, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-carlsen/new-nsa-
mexico-leaks_b_4134434.html (observing that US intervention in the militarization of the drug 
war “achieved an unprecedented margin to operate in-country, effectively breaking down any 
remaining nationalist resistance to their activities on Mexican soil.”); Laura Carlsen, Latin 
America Builds Momentum Against U.S.-Backed Drug War, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-carlsen/latin-america-war-on-drugs_b_4068005
.html (observing that the drug war is a critical piece in the Pentagon's global deployment plans 
and it feeds hugely powerful defense-intelligence industries); Isabella Bakker & Stephen Gill, 
Global Political Economy and Social Reproduction in POWER, PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL 
REPRODUCTION 3, 5 (Isabella Bakker & Stephen Gill, eds. 2003) (arguing that the dominant 
global governance framework associated with neoliberalism seeks to create an economy 
favorable to transnational corporations and others who dominate world markets). 
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The law, too, is complicit with the “logic” of the discourse of the 
violent Mexican as it is constitutive of the narrative. Clifford Geertz 
has elucidated this relationship, positing that legal thought is 
“constructive of social realities rather than merely reflective of 
them.32 Transnational legal processes compare similarly with the laws 
and legal policy at the federal, state, and local level. Each tends to 
rely on strategies of escalating fear, militarization, and criminalization 
to address underlying political and socio-economic problems, many 
of which have structural dimensions and historical antecedents. These 
legal developments help to construct the phenomenon of the 
Mexican-as-criminal just as they regulate the day-to-day lives of 
Mexicans on both sides of the border.33   
A. The Transnational: Creating and Responding to the Mexican as 
the New Terrorist  
1. The Narrative:  Mexicans and Drug Cartel Violence—the “New 
Monolithic Threat”34 
A powerful narrative about threats posed by Mexican drug cartel 
violence, criminality, and the loss of control of the US-Mexico border 
continues unabated. US politicians have described foreign drug 
trafficking as “the new communism, the new monolithic threat.”35  
The United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) 
has declared that drug trafficking-related crime is now considered the 
most significant threat to regional economic growth and democracy.36  
In the realm of the transnational, drug-related crime has been 
described as a “narcoinsurgency” posing grave concerns for US 
homeland security.37 The cartels have been characterized as “all at 

32. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in 
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 232 (1983).  
33. Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
839, 854-55 (2011). 
34. Peter Andreas, The Rise of the American Crimefare State, 14 WORLD POL’Y J. 37, 37 
(1997). 
35. Id. 
36. Damien Cave & Michael S. Schmidt, Rise in Pill Abuse Forces New Look at U.S. 
Drug Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, at A1 (referencing comments by Mark Feierstein, 
Associate Administrator for Latin America & the Caribbean, US Agency for International 
Development). 
37. Entous & Hodge, supra note 2 (quoting a retired Army officer and professor of 
international relations and history); UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND, JOINT 
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once, transnational criminal organizations, international terrorist 
organizations, and insurgents under the law of war”38 and the “the 
greatest organized crime threat to the United States.”39   
Former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and Secretary of 
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano both have equated the dangers 
of drug-cartel violence with the threat of terrorism and compared the 
phenomenon to an insurgency that imperils the national interests of 
the United States.40 Members of Congress have likened Mexican drug 
cartels to al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Hezbollah and have urged their 
designation as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.41 As one researcher 
who studies US-Mexico border policies has observed, “[i]n the new 
lexicon of the Obama administration, the old ‘war on drugs’ has been 
superseded by the new combat against ‘transnational threats,’ 
‘transnational organized crime’ and ‘transnational criminal 
organizations’ (“TCOs”).”42    
 The Pentagon declares the need “to hunt drug cartels in the 
same way special operations teams hunt al-Qaida.”43 The US Joint 

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT: CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE JOINT 
FORCE 34 (2008), available at  https://www.fas.org/man/eprint/joe2008.pdf.  
38. Carrie F. Cordero, Breaking the Mexican Cartels: A Key Homeland Security 
Challenge for the Next Four Years, 81 UMKC L. REV. 290, 291 (2013). 
39. Douglas Farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for 
the Mérida Initiative Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation (May 
2010), available at http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20101113_
MoneyLaundandBulkCash_Farah.pdf.  
40. Paul Richter & Ken Dilanian, Clinton Says Mexico Drug Wars Starting to Look like 
Insurgency, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/09/world/la-fg-
mexico-insurgency-20100909; Entous & Hodge, supra note 2; U.S. Can Do More to Help 
Mexico Fight Drug Cartels, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/
2010/POLITICS/10/16/clinton.drug.cartels/index.html?hpt=T1; Secretary Napolitano and 
Mexican Counterparts Sign Arrangements to Bolster Bilateral Border and Aviation Security, 
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary (Mar. 23, 2010), available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2010/03/23/secretary-napolitano-and-mexican-counterparts-sign-
arrangements-bolster-bilateral. 
41. See Andrea N. Sánchez, Mexico's Drug “War”: Drawing a Line Between Rhetoric 
and Reality, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 467, 477 n.83 (2013); Emerging Threats and Security in the 
Western Hemisphere: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) 
(statement of Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairwoman). 
42. Tom Barry, ACTTing Out at Ground Zero in Arizona–Where the Drug War Now Has 
a “Unified Command”, BORDER LINES BLOG (Sept. 9, 2011), http://borderlinesblog.
blogspot.com/2011/09/actting-out-in-arizona-where-drug-war.html (attributing the official 
shift in terminology to Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime issued by the White 
House in July 2011). 
43. Kimberly Dozier, New US Special Operations Headquarters To Help Mexican 
Forces To Fight Drug Gangs, EL PASO TIMES (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http:// 
www.elpasotimes.com/ci_22392813/us-commandos-boost-numbers-train-mexican-forces. 
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Forces Command warns of the need of an “American response” to 
protect US security interests and has listed Mexico as one of two 
countries determined to be “worst case scenarios” in the event of the 
collapse of the state.44  In May 2013, NATO’s outgoing supreme 
commander, Admiral James G. Stavridis, speculated that “[d]rug 
cartels along America’s southern border . . . might come to make 
common cause with terrorist or militant organizations to bring in 
weapons or bomber makers.”45 He concluded that “[t]here are times 
we have to apply lethal force.”46 Undersecretary of the Army Joseph 
Wesphal too suggested that the United States consider sending troops 
to Mexico.47 
The US Northern Command has called for nothing less than the 
militarization of the border.48 Others similarly propose a “power” 
approach and emphasize the need for a strong US military presence in 
Mexico in order to “expand American influence and establish the 
legitimacy of American action” and “achieve American objectives.”49   
President Obama pledged to send 1200 National Guard troops to the 
border to prevent the violence from spilling over into the United 
States; his administration has emphasized the need for increasing 
military and intelligence activities.50 In the name of US national 
security, the Obama administration has established an intelligence 
outpost on a Mexican military base.51   
It is not only the invocation of the threat of a foreign invasion by 
dangerous criminals that serves as justification for the heightened US 

44. Entous & Hodge, supra note 2 at 36. 
45. Thom Shanker, Globalization Creates a New Worry: Enemy Convergence, AT WAR 
BLOG (May 30, 2013), http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/30/globalization-creates-a-
new-worry-enemy-convergence/?ref=drugtrafficking.  
46. Id. 
47. Nacha Cattan & Stephen Kurczy, Mexico Drug War an 'Insurgency'? US Official's 
Gaffe Sparks US-Mexico Row, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2011/0210/Mexico-drug-war-an-insurgency-US-
official-s-gaffe-sparks-US-Mexico-row; Id. (Westphal later backed off of his comments). 
48. Dudley Althaus, Fort Hancock Residents Don’t Like the Fence, But Value Security, 
HOUSTON CHRON. Feb. 28, 2009; US Poised to Join Mexico Drug War, BBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7949665.stm. 
49. Kevin H. Govern, Reinforcing the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Mexico 
Through U.S. Special Operations Forces Missions, 19 L. & BUS. REV. AMS. 503, 508-09 
(2013). 
50. Randal C. Archibold, Obama to Send up to 1,200 Troops to Border, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 26, 2010, at A1; Entous & Hodge, supra note 2. 
51. Mark Mazzetti & Ginger Thompson, U.S. Widens Role in Mexican Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, at A1 (observing that the United States has authorized drones and 
manned aircraft to fly into Mexico). 
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military response to Mexico’s drug cartels. Drug cartel violence 
increased as the United States and Mexico were establishing a more 
integrated economy through NAFTA.52 Demands for a military 
response were advanced for the purpose of protecting emerging 
transnational trade and commercial networks. In fact, plans for new 
cross-border military initiatives appeared when drug violence began 
to affect important industrial corridors.53 As political analyst Laura 
Carlsen explains, the United States “sought a means to extend its 
national security doctrine to its regional trade partners.”54 Counter-
terrorism initiatives, she notes, were in fact designed to protect 
“strategic resources and investments.”55 Assistant Secretary of State 
Tom Shannon called these strategies the “armoring [of] NAFTA.”56 
Congressional representatives justify support for transnational 
intervention against drug cartel violence in defense of US economic 
well-being.57 Multinational corporate executives have expressed 
concern about the loss of profits in areas of construction and tourism 
due to the violence and have appealed to the US government to curtail 
the chaos.58 Others with interests in supply-chain maquiladoras and 
manufacturing interests located in Mexico have expressed concerns 
about the volatile circumstances in Mexico and the effects on business 

52. Weissman, supra note 14, at 1475-77. 
53. Mazzetti & Thompson, supra note 51. 
54. Laura Carlsen, Perils of Plan Mexico: Going Beyond Security to Strengthen U.S.-
Mexico Relations, AMERICAS PROGRAM (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.cipamericas.org/
archives/1925.  
55. Id.; see also LAURA CARLSEN, ARMORING NAFTA: THE BATTLEGROUND FOR 
MEXICO’S FUTURE n.2  (2008) (citing Thomas Shannon, US Assistant Secretary of State for 
Western Hemisphere Affairs using the term “armoring NAFTA,” Speech to the Council on the 
Americas, (Apr. 3, 2008)). 
56. CARLSEN, supra note 55. 
57. U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Next Steps for the Mérida Initiative Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism of the H. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec., and the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Rep. Henry Cuellar, Statement of Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Policy, Office of International Affairs, DHS); id. at 21, 23-24 
(statement of Mariko Silver) (noting the “false dichotomy between economic prosperity and 
national security”); id. at 80 (statement of John Negroponte), available at  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg62401/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg62401.pdf.   
58. Devin Parsons, The Nature of the U.S.-Mexico Drug War: Equal Responsibility, 
Unequal Costs, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (June 9, 2010) http://www.coha.org/
the-nature-of-the-u-s-mexico-drug-war-equal-responsibility-unequal-costs/ (referring to 
Bloomberg Businessweek’s quote of  the chief economist at J.P. Morgan Chase in Mexico City 
who expressed investor concerns). 
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profitability.59 The US Chamber of Commerce called for action to 
address the imminent threat to business interests while invoking the 
specter of “border-related security challenges and the threat of 
terrorism.”60 At the same time, US defense contractors have 
benefitted from the sale of military equipment, and business interests 
promote the privatization of security to protect their investments.61   
That border cities such as El Paso and San Diego, in close 
proximity with Mexican cities once considered the most dangerous in 
Mexico, have the lowest crime rates in the United States—as 
Congressional Quarterly data demonstrates—somehow has not fit 
into the narrative calculus.62 A study analyzing over a decade of crime 
data of the four US-Mexico border states, including information from 
1,600 local law enforcement agencies as well as federal crime 
statistics, found that “US border cities were statistically safer on 
average than other cities in their states. Those border cities, big and 
small, have maintained lower crime rates than the national average . . 
. . ”63 Moreover, as one researcher has observed, Mexicans attempting 
to cross the border are all “lumped in with drug and human 
traffickers,” without distinction between those who seek to migrate to 
the United States “because of the disastrous economic and 
employment situation created by policies like NAFTA” and cartel 
members who may desire to traffic drugs.64 Whether the threat is 
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59. Gary J. Hale, A Failed State in Mexico: Tamaulipas Declares Itself Ungovernable, 
JAMES A. BAKER III INST. PUB. POL’Y RICE U. 6, 23 (2011),  http://bakerinstitute.org/
media/files/Research/b0596728/DRUG-pub-HaleTamaulipasFailedState-072611.pdf. 
60. STEPS TO A 21ST CENTURY U.S.-MEXICO BORDER, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE 6, 8-9 (2011), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/
2011_us_mexico_report.pdf. 
61. Id. at 9;  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-253R, STATUS OF 
FUNDS FOR THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 12 (2010). 
62. 2 U.S.-Mexico Border Cities Boast Lowest Crime Rates, New Data Shows, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/08/2-us-mexico-
border-cities_n_2647897.html; Christopher Dickey, Reading, Ranting, And Arithmetic, 
NEWSWEEK (May 27, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/27/reading-ranting-and-
arithmetic.print.html (reporting on FBI data that indicates that immigrant cities in the 
Southwest have had a decline in the crime rate). Crime has notably decreased in the Mexican 
border cities as well. See Cave, supra note 9. 
63. Alan Gomez et al., U.S. Border Cities Prove Havens from Mexico's Drug Violence, 
USA TODAY (July 18, 2014), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2011-07-15-
border-violence-main_n.htm. 
64. Laura Carlsen, Napolitano in Texas: Tough Talk, Little Coherence, AMERICAS 
MEXICOBLOG (Feb. 3, 2011), http://americasmexico.blogspot.com/2011/02/napolitano-in-
texas-tough-talk-little.html (quoting then Secretary Janet Napolitano issuing one broad threat 
154 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:141 
expressed as one of gruesome death or the demise of profits, the 
dominant narrative fosters the misperception of increasing rates of 
crime and violence along the southwestern border and puts the US on 
war-footing with Mexico and the ubiquitous Mexican-as-criminal.65   
2.  Transnational Legal Processes66 
The narrative of Mexican drug war violence fits within the 
description of a “noisy construction [ ] manifest[ed] in moral panic 
accompanied by high levels of public, political, and media 
attention.”67 It performs as the specter of transnational crime and 
serves as the “new moral imperative” for extraterritorial intervention 
and transnational policing.68 The rhetoric of war has shaped the 
principles around which relations with Mexico are organized.69 As 
one expert observed, “[t]o frame the problem as an insurgency almost 
necessarily invites a military response”—and in this case, it is a 
response consummated through transnational legal processes.70 This 
section reviews the transnational legal agreements that have 
legitimized the militarization strategies and authorized US 
intervention in the national security and constitutional legal affairs of 
Mexico. 
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to drug cartel members and immigrants seeking work). Federal agencies that report on illegal 
border activity do not distinguish between types of border arrests. See Barry, supra note 42. 
65. Gomez et al., supra note 63 (noting that 83% of US citizens erroneously believe the 
rate of violence along the southwestern border is higher than national rates). 
66. Transnational law “comprises legal norms that apply across borders to parties located 
in more than one jurisdiction.” Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Processes and State 
Change, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 232 (2012). Transnational law can include hard and 
soft rules, and can be bilateral, regional, or multilateral in nature. Id. at 233, 237. It generally 
refers to legal processes that “targets transnational events and activities—that is, transnational 
situations which involve more than one national jurisdiction.”  Id. at 233. 
67. Michael Welch, Panic, Risk, Control, Conceptualizing Threats in a Post-9/11 
Society, 17, 21 in PUNISHING IMMIGRANTS, POLICY, POLITICS, AND INJUSTICE (Kubrin et al., 
eds. 2012). 
68. Id. at 40.   
69. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN 
THE AGE OF EMPIRE 12 (2012) (describing war as “the primary organizing principle of 
society”). 
70. Entous & Hodge, supra note 2 (quoting a retired Army officer and professor of 
international relations and history). 
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  i.  Bilateral legal transactions: legalizing military 
initiatives  
 A series of militarization strategies have been countenanced 
through binational legal transactions enacted between the United 
States and Mexico.71 These arrangements are best characterized by 
agreements that have authorized US intervention in Mexico in the 
form of an armed offensive against drug trafficking organizations—a 
war fought on Mexican territory. These agreements have legalized 
joint law enforcement operations within Mexico and on the US-
Mexico border.72 New accords have authorized US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents to carry out “in depth 
investigations” with Mexican law enforcement agents.73 US-Mexico 
pacts have expanded the jurisdiction of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (“DEA”) whose agents have been permitted to engage 
in surveillance, arrests, and seizures in Mexico.74 They have 
empowered the US military’s Joint Task Force-Six to conduct covert 
troop operations, eighty percent of these in Mexico.75 Some of these 
agreements require Mexican governmental institutions to 
accommodate the presence of US agencies within their offices.76  
Recently, US-proposed legislation seeks to militarize Mexico’s 
southern border through a ‘‘Foreign Military Financing Program’’ in 
response to the crisis of Central American children fleeing violence.77  
These legal transactions function as a “politics of authority” and 
reinforce fear and nationalistic rhetoric.78 
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71. See SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 7, at Appendix C; JAMES O. FINCKENAUER ET 
AL., MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES: NEIGHBORS CONFRONT DRUG TRAFFICKING 
(2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/218561.pdf. 
72.  SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 7, at 5. 
73. See SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 7, at Appendix C (describing Border 
Enforcement Security Taskforces (“BEST”) teams). 
74. Id. (describing Project Reckoning). 
75. U.S.-MEXICO BORDER POLICY REPORT, BORDER NETWORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
& BORDER ACTION NETWORK, at 13 (2008), https://www.utexas.edu/law/centers/
humanrights/borderwall/communities/municipalities-US-Mexico-Border-Policy-Report.pdf 
(describing more than 4000 such operations and documenting human rights violations, 
avoidable deaths, and the dangers of smuggling as a result of border security programs). 
76.  SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 7, at Appendix C (describing the Electronic Trace 
Submission System where US Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms maintains a foreign attaché in 
Mexico City).   
77. H.R. REP. NO. 110 (2014), available at http://appropriations.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/bills-113hr-sc-ap-fy2015-stateforop-subcommitteedraft.pdf.  
78. Welch, supra note 67, at 26. 
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 The most important transnational legal response to the 
narrative of drug violence has been the Mérida Initiative, a 
congressionally funded mandate to intervene in the Mexican drug 
cartel phenomenon.79 Enacted in October 2007, this “regional security 
partnership” was designed to develop a heightened military response 
to Mexico’s drug wars.80 A joint US-Mexico statement set forth its 
primary purpose:  “to maximize the effectiveness of our efforts to 
fight criminal organizations.”81 The plan, when first initiated, 
involved four goals: (1) break the power and impunity of criminal 
organizations; (2) assist in strengthening border, air, and maritime 
controls; (3) improve the capacity of justice systems; and (4) curtail 
gang activity and diminish the demand for drugs in the region.82   
 The Mérida Initiative was enacted to “enhance the ability of 
the Government of Mexico, in cooperation with the United States, to 
control illicit narcotics production, trafficking, drug trafficking 
organizations (“DTOs”), and organized crime” as well as to 
“strengthen respect for internationally-recognized human rights and 
the rule of law.” 83 Congress, at the inception, however, promoted the 
pact as one that needed to focus first and foremost on “assistance to 
the armed forces of Mexico.”84 Mérida Initiative funding has 
exceeded US$1.2 billion in foreign aid, most of which has been 
allocated for the Mexican purchase of US military equipment, new 
surveillance technologies, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and 
the training of Mexican police.85 US military officials have deemed 
the Mérida Initiative a directive to prepare Mexico’s military “for a 
war much like the ones Washington is waging in Afghanistan and 
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79. Act of June 30, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-252, 122 Stat. 2323;  see SEELKE & FINKLEA, 
supra note 7. 
80. Id. 
81. Office of the Spokesman Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative: A New Paradigm 
for Security Cooperation, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 22, 2007), available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93817.htm.  
82. Counternarcotics and Law Enforcement Country Program: Mexico, U.S. DEP’T 
STATE (Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/114078.htm. 
83. Merida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime 
Authorization Act of 2008, H.R. REP. NO. 6028, § I(A)(111) (2007-2008), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&sid=cp110h8NYK&refer=&r_n=hr673p1.110&db_
id=110&item=&sel=TOC_87483& (noting short-term security efforts are needed to stabilize 
the situation). 
84. Id. 
85. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 7, at 8.    
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Iraq.”86 Since 2008, funding for the Initiative has doubled, and it is 
presently the largest US foreign aid program. 87 
Critics have questioned the very premises of the Mérida 
Initiative.88 Mexico experts have observed that the plan’s purpose was 
wrong-headed from the start:  
The official intention to ‘fight criminal organizations . . . [and] 
disrupt drug-trafficking . . . weapons trafficking, illicit financial 
activities and currency smuggling, and human trafficking’ . . .  
cannot be reconciled with the Mexican military’s record of 
human rights abuses or with the fact that money laundering and 
weapons trafficking have never been tightly regulated by the 
United States.89  
As a result of these transnational agreements, human rights 
advocates have documented discernible and destructive 
consequences.90 According to 145 civil society organizations in the 
region, these agreements have enabled war strategies that have 
resulted in a “dramatic surge in violent crime, often reportedly 
perpetrated by security forces themselves.”91 Efforts to suppress the 
cartels through military means demonstrably increased the violence 
and resulted in untold numbers of human rights abuses, including 
rapes, murder, harassment of labor and land activists, and torture of 
innocent citizens at the hands of security forces.92 Drug cartel 
operations became more sophisticated in response to Mérida’s 
military initiatives. Some Mexican soldiers trained by US military 

86. Kristin Bricker, Merida Initiative Under Scrutiny Following Clinton’s Visit to 
Mexico, NACLA, https://nacla.org/news/merida-initiative-under-scrutiny-following-clinton%
25E2%2580%2599s-visit-mexico (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
87. Suzanna Reiss, Beyond Supply and Demand: Obama’s Drug Wars in Latin America, 
NACLA REP. AMS., 27-31, 38 (Jan./Feb. 2010), available at https://nacla.org/news/beyond-
supply-and-demand-obama’s-drug-wars-latin-america. 
88. There are no findings demonstrating whether there is a relationship between drug 
trafficking-related violence in Mexico and in the United States. See SEELKE & FINKLEA, 
supra note 7 at 5. 
89. See Julien Mercille, The Media-Entertainment Industry and the “War on Drugs” in 
Mexico, 41 LAT. AM. PERSP. 110, 117 (2013). 
90. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 7, at 29; Alexander Main, The U.S. Re-
militarization of Central America and Mexico, 47 NACLA REP. AMS. 65, 68 (2014) (noting 
that Human Rights Watch has calculated that at least 80,000 Mexicans have died and over 
200,000 have been displaced since the United States assisted with the militarization of the war 
against drug cartels).  
91. Main, supra note 90, at 65. 
92. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIFORM 
IMPUNITY 2 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
mexico0409web_0.pdf; Carlsen, supra note 22; Reiss, supra note 87, at 28.  
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personnel subsequently left the Mexican army and joined violent 
cartels where they have carried out acts of gruesome brutality.93 As 
one Mexican writer put it, “[y]ou didn’t have to be a genius to see that 
a military challenge to the narcos would lead to the militarisation of 
the narcos.”94 The US State Department’s annual report on human 
rights in Mexico, while supportive of the Mérida Initiative, also found 
that “accusations of [Mexican] army abuses had risen sixfold” since 
the offensive against drug cartels began and documented evidence of 
extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and torture.95 One human rights 
group observed that the Mérida Initiative has turned Ciudad Juárez 
into “Mexico’s Baghdad.”96 
  Others have critiqued the initiative as a scheme to benefit US 
military hardware firms who have “become ‘de facto agents of 
foreign policy.’”97 While a joint initiative in name, it is largely 
controlled by the United States. Mexican journalists have called the 
Mérida Initiative “a grotesque and absurd pretension.”98 Mexico 
City’s Archdioceses urged “rejection” of the plan and derided it as no 
more than “offensive charity.”99 With its focus on the need to control 
and punish, it replicates historical stereotypes that Mexicans are 
“‘brutal,’ ‘bloodthirsty,’ [and] ‘barbarous’” without any consideration 
of the determinants of the violence.100  
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93. Frank Koughan, U.S.-Trained Death Squads? How America’s Latest Drug War 
Could Aid the Cartels and Enrich Military Contractors, MOTHER JONES (Jul.-Aug. 2009), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/07/us-trained-death-squads; see also LAURIE 
FREEMAN, DÉJÀ VU: DRUG POLICY ON THE US-MEXICO BORDER (2008), available at 
http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/past/Merida%20Initiative_Lauri
e.pdf (English translation). 
94. Álvaro Enrigue, When a Corpse Is a Message, 36 LONDON REV. BOOKS 21 (May 8, 
2014). 
95. Marc Lacey, Rights Group Report Faults Mexican Army’s Conduct in Drug War, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009 at A12. 
96. POLICY ANALYSIS: New Phase of the Mérida Initiative Brings the Same Violence, 
WITNESS FOR PEACE (May 25, 2010), http://www.witnessforpeace.org/article.php?id=963. 
97. See generally Jeffrey E. Garten, Business and Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF. 
(May/June 1997), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53047/jeffrey-e-garten/business-and-
foreign-policy (describing the role of US firms). 
98. Marc Lacey, Congress Trims Bush’s Mexico Drug Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, 
at A6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting from an editorial in the Mexican newspaper, 
LA JORNADA). 
99. GEORGE W. GRAYSON, MEXICO NARCO VIOLENCE AND A FAILED STATE? 237 
(2010). 
100. Colin Campbell, A Social Constructivist Analysis of US-Mexican Bilateral 
Military Relations, 2000-2008, 6 (paper presented at the 2010 Congress of Latin American 
Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 6-9 October 2010), http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/
members/congress-papers/lasa2010/files/1270.pdf  (observing that the United States has 
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Life at the border has been described as “a constant skirting on 
the edges of death.”101 As a result of agreements to fortify the border, 
immigrants attempt dangerous crossings into remote areas where 
thousands have met horrific deaths in inhospitable desert terrain.102  
Despite reduced numbers of Mexicans seeking to cross the border, the 
number of migrant deaths has dramatically increased.103   
Transnational initiatives have also created hardship on the US 
side of the border, which has been physically transformed from a river 
to a wall of barbed wire, steel, and concrete—that is, a war zone.104  
Sophisticated military equipment and helicopters are utilized and in 
full view; residents living in the shadow of such construction cannot 
but experience fear, intimidation, and hostility.105 US border towns 
have been described as “police states” and “militarized zones.”106  
Residents, who endure military-style stops, routine law enforcement 
stops, checkpoints, and searches, are harassed and terrorized and have 
begun to protest the intrusions as unlawful, un-American, and 

supported military initiatives in Latin America that have served as repressive mechanisms 
designed to eliminate “‘subversives’ [as] a matter of ‘national security’”); Leticia M. Saucedo, 
Anglo Views of Mexican Labor:  Shaping The Law of Temporary Work Through Masculinities 
Narratives, 13 NEV. L.J. 547 (2013). For a review of the determinants of violence in Mexico, 
see Weissman, supra note 14; Deborah M. Weissman, The Political Economy of Violence: 
Toward an Understanding of The Gender-Based Murders of Ciudad Juárez, 30 N.C. J. INT’L. 
& COMM. REG. 795 (2005). 
101. Elvia R. Arriola, Voices from the Barbed Wires of Despair: Women in the 
Maquiladoras, Latina Critical Legal Theory and Gender at the U.S.-México Border, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 729, 750 (2000); U.S.-MEXICO BORDER POLICY REPORT, supra note 75, at 
12-13 (documenting human rights violations, avoidable deaths, and other dangers as a result of 
border security programs). 
102. See Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended 
Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy, 27 POP. & DEV. REV. 661, 669 (2001) (noting the 
sharp increase in the numbers of those dying trying to cross into the United States since the 
militarization of the border crossing has taken place); Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 193, 221-22 (lamenting that “thousands have died agonizing deaths from heat, 
cold, and thirst”). 
103. See Undocumented Border Crossings Decline, Aug. 22-Sept 4, 2011, MEXICO 
SOLIDARITY NETWORK (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.mexicosolidarity.org/post/2011/
september/mexiconewsandanalysisaug22sept42011.  
104. See Cornelius, supra note 102, at 663 (describing the thousand of Border Patrol 
agents, high-intensity lighting, steel fencing, infrared night scopes, motion-detecting sensors, 
and video surveillance along the Mexico-US border); Arriola, supra note 101. 
105. Arriola, supra note 101. 
106. Interview with B. Lucero (2014) (notes on file with author). For a description of the 
militarization of the US border, see generally National Immigration Forum, Southwest Border 
Security Operations, http://immigrationforum.org/blog/backgrounder-southwest-border-
security-operations?. 
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unnecessary.107 Nor do oppressive police practices end at the border.  
Racial profiling of Latinos now occurs with increasing frequency 
throughout the United States and “[i]n this way, searches and seizures 
do more than their ordinary or “interior” investigatory work; they 
perform extraordinary or “border” work as well.”108 
These transnational legal processes constitute legal norms that 
validate the moral panic associated with circumstances in Mexico, 
and contribute to a climate of fear. They reflect the consequences of a 
narrative that has promoted closer ties between the US and Mexican 
militaries.109 They have given power and authority to the narrative of 
the Mexican-as-criminal.110 
 ii.  The mérida initiative phase II and the rule of law program111  
In 2009, after funds were allocated for military equipment to 
escalate the war on drug cartels, the Obama administration introduced 
Phase II, known as Beyond Mérida, which called for the remaking of 
Mexico’s “weak institutions” and the reform of Mexico’s legal 
system.112 USAID and the Department of Justice were charged with 
administering the Mérida Rule of Law program, and in collaboration 
with the State Department, they have contracted with private 
international development firms based in Washington, D.C.113 These 

107. Id; see U.S.-MEXICO BORDER POLICY REPORT, supra note 75, at 14. Fernanda 
Santos, Border Patrol Scrutiny Stirs Anger in Arizona Town, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2014, at 
A13 (describing frustrated, angry US citizens who live near the border and are routinely 
stopped and questioned). 
108. Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1547 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
109. See Mercille, supra note 89, at 112. 
110. Id. at 23; Thomas Schultz, Why Being law Matters, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGALITY: STATELESS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2433466 (explaining the effect of law on legitimacy and power). 
111. For a thorough critique of the Mérida Rule of Law program, see Weissman, supra 
note 14. 
112. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 7, at 1; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-
837, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime 
Support But Needs Better Performance Measures 6 (2010) available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10837.pdf [hereinafter USGAO, Mérida Initiative]. 
113. The two primary firms with whom USAID has contracted are Management 
Information Systems (“MSI”) and Management Sciences for Development, Inc. (“MSD”). 
About MSI, Mgmt. Sys. Int’l, MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.msiworldwide.com/wp-content/uploads/MSI_one_page_eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 
26, 2014); Brigitte Claney, Coffey International Limited Awarded USD $66.3 Million USAID 
Rule of Law Project in Mexico, COFFEY (July 3, 2009), http://www.coffey.com/our-news/
media-releases/coffey-international-limited-awarded-usd-66-3-million-usaid-rule-of-law-
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firms have drafted, promoted, and managed the processes for 
comprehensive revisions of Mexico’s constitution, specifically as it 
relates to criminal justice, seizure laws, and federal and state criminal 
procedure codes.114 
The Mérida Rule of Law plan is first and foremost a law-and-
order plan.115 Millions of dollars have been allocated to fund 
espionage systems directed at Mexican citizens, to improve 
prosecutorial capacity, increase the internal control systems within the 
Mexican federal police and the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, 
improve extradition processes, and enhance sentencing and other 
related criminal penalties.116 New prisons throughout Mexico have 
been funded.117 The largest allocations have gone to International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement and Foreign Military 
Financing.118 A central focus of Mérida Phase II’s Rule of Law 
Program has been its program to remake Mexico’s criminal legal 
system and replicate “American-style” criminal trials.119 

project-in-mexico; MGMT. SCI. FOR DEV., http://www.msdglobal.com (last visited Mar. 22, 
2014); Strengthening Justice Systems in Mexico, MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.msiworldwide.com/project/strengthening-justice-systems-in-mexico (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2014); see also USGAO, Mérida Initiative, supra note 112; Rule of Law, U.S. 
AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Jan. 10, 2014), http://transition.usaid.gov/mx/ruleoflaweng.html. 
114. See Mgmt. Sys. Int’l, Mexico Rule of Law Strengthening: Final Report to USAID 
July 6, 2004 to September 30, 2007, 4 (2007), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/
pdf_docs/PDACO092.pdf; see also MSD/Proderecho, Quarterly Report January 1–March 31, 
2008, 1 (2008), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACO077.pdf; SEELKE & 
FINKLEA, supra note 72, at 21; Wilson Ctr., Mexico Inst., Group III—Institution Building 
and Rule of Law (2008), available at http://mexicoinstitute.files.wordpress.com/
2012/08/merida-initiative-part2.pdf. 
115. See SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 72, at 19, 22, 24; U.S. Gov’t Accountability 
Office, GAO-10-253R, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative 5, 14, 22, 24 (2009), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10253r.pdf (describing new training programs for 
prosecutors, investigators and forensic experts). 
116.  SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 7, at 24; David T. Johnson, The Mérida Initiative: 
A New Security Cooperation Partnership, 18 NAT’L STRATEGY FORUM REV. (2009), available 
at http://www.nationalstrategy.com/NSFReview/Fall2009Vol18Issue3USMexico/
LeadArticle3.aspx; see Laura Carlsen, A Primer on Plan Mexico, AMS. PROGRAM (May 5, 
2008), http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1474. 
117. Mérida Initiative at a Glance: Law Enforcement Achievements, U.S. EMBASSY IN 
MEXICO, http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/merida/emerida_factsheet_lawenforcement
.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
118. THOMAS H. ISOM, PRI AND THE BEYOND MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 2 (2011), available 
at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555293 (report submitted by student, a 
Colonel in the US Navy, at the Naval War College). 
119. Ronald F. Wright, Mexican Drug Violence and Adversarial Experiments, 35 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 363, 381 (2010) (noting that a shift to an “accusatorial” system in 
Mexico was deemed appropriate by US funders); see U.S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO, FACT SHEET: 
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The Mexican legal system is most assuredly in need of 
reform.120 The climate of impunity has been identified as a 
fundamental cause of violence.121 Mexican citizens have little trust in 
law enforcement agencies and are fearful to report crime.122  
Moreover, Phase II represents a discursive shift from a policy that 
emphasized military escalation as the priority to “building the rule of 
law.”123   
 Yet there is reason for skepticism and concern about the Rule 
of Law program. Mexican human rights groups and civil society 
generally have long been wary of the excessive power of police and 
prosecutors.124 Legal studies have demonstrated that Mexicans have a 
high rate of distrust for the office of the prosecutor when compared 
with other nations.125 In considering how best to reform their legal 

THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE-MAJOR DELIVERIES IN 2011 (2012), available at 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/23jan12/2011%20Major%20Deliveries_
2012.pdf; Karla Zabludovsky, In Mexico, Rehearsing to Inject Drama into the Courtroom, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2012, at A7; see, e.g., Jerry Crimmins, Train in U.S. for Changes in 
Their Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at A12. Funds have been allocated to School 
Helps Mexico Change Trial Process, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Aug. 14, 2009), 
http://www.globaltort.com/2009/08/differences-in-legal-systems-mexico-and-the-us-on-
criminal-law (describing Chicago-Kent Law School’s involvement in reforming Mexico’s 
“ancient” criminal trial processes). 
120. David Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council on 
Foreign Relations, (March 2011), available at http://www.cfr.org/mexico/drug-war-
mexico/p24262; see MATTHEW C. INGRAM ET AL., ASSESSING MEXICO’S JUDICIAL REFORM 4 
(2012), available at http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/tbi-assessing-judicial-
reform1.pdf.  
121. Mexico: Intolerable Killings: 10 Years of Abductions and Murders of Women in 
Ciudad Juárez and Chihuahua: Summary Report and Appeals Cases, AMNESTY INT’L (2003), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR41/027/2003/en/e81827cb-d6b3-
11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/amr410272003en.pdf. 
122. JO TUCKMAN, MEXICO: DEMOCRACY INTERRUPTED 108 (2012) (reporting over 
80% of crime victims consider it a “waste of time” to report the crime to authorities); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, Mexico, in WORLD REPORT 191 (2009), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf. 
123. Human Rights in Mexico: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Tom 
Lantos Human Rights Commission, 112th Cong. 9 (2012) (statement of Maureen Meyer, 
Senior Assoc., Wash. Office on Latin Am. on Human Rights in Mexico), available at 
http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/2012/MMeyer%20testimony%
20TLHRC.pdf (urging continued US support for the rule of project). 
124. See Justice Reform Season Opens, CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07MEXICO4881 (Sept. 
10, 2007, 11:03 PM), http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07MEXICO4881&
q=07mexico4881; see Weissman, supra note 14, 1497-1500. 
125. See Hiroshi Fukurai & Richard Krooth, The Establishment of All-Citizen Juries as a 
Key Component of Mexico’s Judicial Reform: Cross-National Analyses of Lay Judge 
Participation and the Search for Mexico’s Judicial Sovereignty, 16 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 
37, 65 (2010). 
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system, many Mexican human rights activists and grassroots 
movements have articulated an agenda different than the US-led 
project; they have demanded an end to the criminalization model and 
instead have called for locally controlled community safety 
programs.126 In spite of the studies’ findings, and against the express 
opposition of many Mexican jurists and human rights groups, the 
United States has concentrated almost entirely on the training of law 
enforcement and prosecutors and funding the Mexican Attorney 
General’s office in the face of ongoing scandals related to corruption, 
bribery, and other crimes that have plagued the bureaucracy.127  
Mexicans have resisted US efforts to revise Mexico’s legal system 
while simultaneously funding weapon systems that have exacerbated 
the violence. Mexican commentators have denounced the Merida 
Initiative Rule of Law program as the imposition of the Monroe 
Doctrine in Mexican courts and the attempted “colonization” of the 
Mexican judicial system.128   
 The United States has failed to provide any useful means by 
which to judge the effectiveness of the Rule of Law program on the 
safety and well-being of citizens of either country.129 Instead, success 
has been measured by the speed with which US military equipment 
has been delivered as well as training opportunities for its use.130 The 
Rule of Law program focuses on criminalization and functions as a 
law and order initiative but fails to promote the fundamental values 

126. Documents of the Movement in Translation: Manifesto the #I am 132 to the People 
of Mexico, UEINTERNATIONAL (July 27, 2012), http://ueinternational.org/MLNA/mlna_
articles.php? id=203#1477 (demanding a change to media, education, the neoliberal economic 
model, and the fulfillment of health rights). 
127. Randal C. Archibold, Top Mob Prosecutor Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012, at 
A8; Mexico’s Federal Attorney General Investigates Its Own Air Fleet for Drug Trafficking, 
THE FULANO FILES (Sept. 8, 2012), http://fulano.info/wordpress/?p=1379; GRAYSON, supra 
note 99, at 147; Carlsen, supra note 54 (noting that Mexican judges from the Supreme Court to 
the lower courts have objected to US reform initiatives); see, e.g., U.S.-MEX. STATE 
ALLIANCE P’SHIP, QUARTERLY REPORT OF ACTIVITIES, APRIL 1, 2011–JUNE 30, 2011, 3D 
QUARTER REPORT 6–18, 21 (2011), available at http://www.statealliancepartnership.org/
activities_files/3_quarter_report_FY201011.pdf (detailing almost exclusively trainings for 
prosecutors); see also William Hine-Ramsberger, Note, Drug Violence and Constitutional 
Revisions: Mexico’s 2008 Criminal Justice Reform and the Formation of Rule of Law, 37 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 291, 315 (2011) (noting that the reforms “perpetuate the expansive power 
of the public prosecutor”).  
128. Paco Rodriguez, Justicia Colonizada, NOTICIASNET.MX (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://www.noticiasnet.mx/portal/principal/justicia-colonizada.  July 13, 2012 
129. See SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 7, at 25. 
130. Id. 
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inherent in the rule of law.131 It does, however, succeed in reinforcing 
the perception of Mexicans who must be captured and punished.   
 B. The National Narrative:  Fear and Loathing of Mexican 
Immigrants 
 1. The Narrative:  Moral Panic and Mexicans 
The transnational narrative breathes new life into the national 
immigration panic discourse that has long plagued Latin Americans 
and Mexicans in particular.132 The US militarized response to drug 
cartel violence in Mexico cannot help but foment public anxiety at 
home.133 Indeed, the narrative of drug-cartel violence has assumed a 
life of its own and has found a receptive milieu in an environment of 
fear and economic insecurity. At the same time the media and 
government officials invoke the threat of terrorist invaders from south 
of the border and plan military initiatives in Mexico, “interior” 
terminology such as “surge operations” have entered the lexicon to 
signal the need to catch the ever-present Mexican criminal at-large 
within the territory of the United States.134 The language of US 
Border Patrol operating within the United States itself now includes 
“such military terms as ‘deconfliction,’ ‘situational awareness,’ 
‘operational control,’ ‘surges,’ ‘forward operating bases,’ ‘common 
operating picture,’ and ‘defense-in-depth’” all in reference to 
domestic activity.135 Politicians invoke similar war metaphors to 
address the threat of immigrants in the United States as those used to 
describe the military efforts in Mexico and have made reference to the 

131. See Nick Cheesman, Law and Order as Asymmetrical Opposite to the Rule of Law, 
6 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF LAW 96, 98 (2014) (noting that despite the frequent conflation of 
law and order with the rule of law, they are “asymmetrically opposed” concepts without shared 
values). 
132. LEO R. CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT 2, 3 (2008) (describing the “grand tradition 
of alarmist discourse about  immigrants and their perceived negative impacts on society”); see 
also KEVIN R. JOHNSON & BERNARD TRUJILLO, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE US-MEXICO 
BORDER, ¿SI SE PUEDE? 4 (2011) (observing that the phrase “illegal alien” refers to 
undocumented immigrants from Mexico). 
133. Nina Bernstein, In Father’s Memory, Fighting to Stay in Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
21, 2010, at A1 (noting that the criminal like practices such as detention and deportation have 
“legitimized treating foreigners a scapegoats”). 
134. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Statement of Alonzo Péna, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Operations, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 2 (May 27, 2010), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/100527pena.pdf; see DANIEL KANSTROOM, 
DEPORTATION NATION 4 (2007). 
135. Barry, supra note 42. 
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domestic “battlefields” of crime and illegal immigration.136 More than 
just illegal drug activity—some have put the full blame for the sex-
slave industry and other violent enterprises within the United States 
on Mexicans.137   
Congressional hearings on immigration-related matters have 
resorted to the use of “tabloid-style titles” and function as a “largely 
fact-free performance” that seize upon dramatic stories that distort the 
truth and offer anecdotes that have been refuted by FBI data regarding 
crime on the border.138 Congressional witnesses reported that the 
“civil authorities, law enforcement agencies as well as [US] citizens 
are under attack around the clock” notwithstanding national, state, 
and local criminal justice data that confirm the decreasing rates of 
violent crime rates on the border and that border cities of all sizes 
demonstrate lower crime rates than the national average.139 Indeed, 
much of the discourse around violent drug cartels functions to 
produce a “moral panic” about Mexicans in the United States.140   
 The specter of the “Mexican-as-criminal” crossing the border 
is said to “gladden[ ] the hearts of politicians on the right.”141 It is 

136. Martha Mendoza, U.S.-Mexico Border Isn't So Dangerous, Border Patrol Agents 
Face Less Danger Than Street Cops in Cities, Data Show, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 30, 
2010) (quoting Arizona Governor Jan Brewer), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37493275/
ns/world_news-americas/; Transcript of G.O.P. Debate, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/05/us/politics/05cnd-transcript.html?pagewanted=6 (quoting 
Tom Tancredo: “[w]hat we’re doing here in this immigration battle is testing our willingness 
to actually hold together as a nation or split apart into a lot of Balkanized pieces.”). 
137. Walter Ewing, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer Still Cannot Connect the Dots 
Between Immigration Reform and Border Security, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2013/08/07/arizona-governor-jan-brewer-still-cannot-connect-
the-dots-between-immigration-reform-and-border-security/. 
138. Walter Ewing, House Hearing, New Report Add to Hysterical Narrative on Border 
Security, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Oct. 17, 2011), http://immigrationimpact.com/
2011/10/17/house-hearing-new-report-add-to-hysterical-narrative-on-border-security/ 
(describing the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and 
Management’s hearing entitled, “A Call to Action: Narco-Terrorism’s Threat to the Southern 
U.S. Border”). 
139. Id. 
140. Jodi Lane, Fear of Gang Crime: A Qualitative Examination of the Four 
Perspectives, 39 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 437, 466 (2002) (describing theoretical models 
about the exaggerated fear of gang violence and attributing such excessive fear as the “likely 
local and national presence of a moral panic about gangs”). 
141. Editorial, Border News, N.Y. TIMES Sept. 5, 2010, at WK7; Randal C. Archibold, 
Obama to Send Up to 1,200 Troops to Border, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/us/26border.html (reporting that both Democrats and 
Republicans rushed to take credit for the Obama administration’s decision to send troops to the 
border); see PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES, POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 43 
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fodder for political demagoguery for those politicians who seek to 
project a tough-on-crime image; Mexicans provides them with readily 
identifiable scapegoats.142 Political fear-mongering about Mexicans 
offers a proven method to gain leverage in electoral contests.143  
Senator John McCain accused Mexican immigrants of setting 
devastating wild fires in Arizona and New Mexico despite the lack of 
any proof to support such a charge.144 Republican Presidential 
candidate Fred Thompson and members of the conservative media 
have attributed the recent US financial crisis to fraud in lending 
practices involving Mexican immigrants.145 Others have invoked fear 
of massive voter fraud, claiming that unauthorized immigrants, most 
of whom are Mexicans, would be attempting to vote en masse 
illegally, and thereby affect the outcome of US elections.146   
 The US State Department often discourages college students 
from traveling to Mexico for their spring break, warning of crime and 
danger.147 For good measure they also issued travel warnings to 
Mexico regarding the risk of  “swine flu,” a disease that some 
scholars have observed, “reinforced the ‘dirty,’ ‘unkempt,’ and 
‘uncivilized’ representations of Mexicans, notwithstanding the fact 
that the disease, later renamed HINI, first originated in a town where 
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(2000) (noting that the military initiative in Mexico has benefitted both Democrats and 
Republicans who seek to out-tough each other on the issue). 
142. See Kevin R. Johnson, It’s The Economy Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate Over 
Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (Or the War on Drugs, War on Terror, 
Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583, 584 (2010) (noting the historical scapegoating of 
immigrants for all social ills). 
143. See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text (discussing of the role of “policy 
entrepreneurs” in fomenting anti-immigrant sentiment). 
144. Roberto Cintli Rodriguez, John McCain's Wildfire Accusations, THE GUARDIAN, 
(June 21, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/21/john-
mccain-arizona-wildfire; Marc Lacey, As Arizona Fire Rages, So Does Rumor on Its Origin, 
N.Y. Times, June 2, 2011, at A16. 
145. Michael Finnegan, Well Ya Got Trouble, Fred, Right Here in River City, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 23, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/23/nation/na-thompson23 
(pandering to accusation about Mexicans “taking over” California, abusing welfare, and 
culpable for the mortgage crisis); see also LOU DOBBS TONIGHT (CNN Oct. 9, 2008), 
available at http://mediamatters.org/research/200810100022#03300902.  
146. Morgan Weiland, Report: Conservative Media Consistently Scapegoat 
Undocumented Immigrants, ACORN, (Apr. 7, 2009) http://mediamatters.org/reports/
200904070005; Illegal Elections and the Electoral College, FEDERATION FOR IMMIGRATION 
REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-aliens-in-elections-and-the-electoral-college (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2014).  
147. Alfredo Carlos, Mexico “Under Siege”: Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism, 41 LAT. 
AM. PERSP. 43, 48 (2013). 
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a US hog-operation corporation improperly handled waste.148 The 
judiciary too is implicated in the invocation of this narrative:  indeed, 
the US Supreme Court has suggested that Mexican immigrants may 
have greater proclivity toward criminal activity than native-born 
citizens.149   
These discursive strategies help to define national membership 
in ways that suggest that most Mexicans ought to remain outside of 
US society.150 They ignore now well-established study statistics about 
crime and immigrants focusing on Mexican immigrants that 
demonstrate that immigrants have lower rates of criminal activity than 
their US citizen counterparts.151   

148. Id. 
149. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. ___ (2012) (“Aliens are reported to be 
responsible for a disproportionate share of serious crime.”); see Heidi Beirich, CIS: The 
“Independent” Think Tank, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Feb. 2009), 
http://www.splcenter.org/publications/the-nativist-lobby-three-faces-of-intolerance/cis-the-
independent-think-tank (claiming that the Supreme Court relies on a report by the Center for 
Immigration Studies which has been faulted as “flawed” and produced by an organization long 
identified as nativist and biased); see also Walter Ewing, Does the Supreme Court Think Most 
Immigrants are Criminals?, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (June 26, 2012), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2012/06/26/does-the-supreme-court-think-most-immigrants-are-
criminals/#sthash.nuEkv6Ys.dpuf.  
150. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN ET AL., ILLEGALITY, NATIONAL ORIGIN CUES, 
AND PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION, 11-12 (2010), available at 
http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/mneblo/papers/Illegality4Web.pdf (observing that most 
Americans view Mexicans less favorably than other foreigners and have difficulty 
distinguishing between lawful and unauthorized Mexicans immigrants).  
151. Id. at 1473-74; Ruben G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant 
Criminality: Imprisonment Among First-and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST. (June 2006), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/debunking-myth-immigrant-
criminality-imprisonment-among-first-and-second-generation-young; Marjorie S. Zatz & 
Hilary Smith, Immigration, Crime, and Victimization:  Rhetoric and Reality, 81 ANN. REV. 
LAW SOC. SCI. 141, 142 (2012) (identifying the numerous studies that demonstrate that 
immigrants commit fewer crimes than native-born persons and that immigration populations 
may actually “serve a protective function, reducing crime”); Robert J. Sampson, Rethinking 
Crime and Immigration, 7 CONTEXTS 28, 29, 33 (2008); Mai Thi Nguyen & Hannah Gill, 
The 287(g) Program:  The Costs and Consequences of Local Immigration Enforcement 
in North Carolina Communities, 14-19 (Feb. 2010), http://cgi.unc.edu/uploads/
mediaitems/287g-report-final.original.pdf; see Emily M. Wright & Michael L. Benson, 
Immigration and Intimate Partner Violence: Exploring the Immigrant Paradox, 57 SOC. 
PROBS. 480 (2010) (finding that lower rates of crime associated with immigrants and 
immigrant enclaves holds true for the phenomenon of intimate partner violence). 
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2. Federal Legal Responses: Crimmigration and Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform 
    i.  Crimmigration 
The narrative of Mexican immigrants threatening the nation has 
contributed to legal developments at the federal level. As one scholar 
has written, “[t]he very act of Mexican border crossing provides the 
exemplary theater for staging the spectacle of ‘the illegal alien’ that 
the law produces.”152 Politicians, relying on national security grounds 
and the moral panic about Mexican invaders, have enacted 
increasingly harsh laws to control immigration that have been used to 
achieve their removal in numbers disproportionate to other foreign 
nationals.153   
While Mexicans have long been vilified and subjected to harsh 
legal immigration restrictions, the interplay between the status of 
Mexican-as-criminal and Mexican-as-immigrant finds its fulcrum at 
the intersection of criminal law and immigration law.  In recent years, 
a number of scholars have identified the way in which criminal laws 
and processes and immigration laws have converged to create its own 
field of law termed “crimmigration.”154 Juliet Stumpf explained the 
use of the term as “the criminalization of immigration law”155 where 
“immigration violations have become federal criminal violations and 
criminal law has come to dominate the development of the law of 
deportation.”156 Stephen Legomsky has examined the phenomenon of 
the intersection of criminal law and immigration law and articulated 

152. Nicholas De Genova, The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant “Illegality”, 2 
LATINO STUD. 177 (2004);  Zatz & Smith, supra note 151, at 145-46 (reviewing the restrictive 
immigration laws that developed in response to the moral panic about Latino, and in particular 
Mexican immigrants). 
153. See Mary Bosworth & Emma Kaufman, Foreigners in a Carceral Age: 
Immigration and Imprisonment in the United States, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 435 
(2011) (observing a disproportionate focus on Mexicans in detention and removal 
proceedings); De Genova, supra note 152, at 167-75 (tracing the history of immigration law 
reform from the 1960s which have had a disproportionately harder impact on Mexicans than 
other immigrants); see also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 
2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1491 (2013). 
154. See generally Juliet P. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
155. Id. at 376. 
156. Id. at 378.  
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the way that increasingly, violators of immigration law suffered 
severe criminal consequences in new if not shocking ways.157   
The study of crimmigration is well-developed and thus, for 
purposes of this Article, requires only a summary overview.158  
Changes to federal laws, as Stumpf has indicated, have “created 
parallel systems in which immigration law and the criminal justice 
system are merely nominally separate.”159 She has articulated that 
“(1) the substance of immigration law and criminal law increasingly 
overlaps, (2) immigration enforcement has come to resemble criminal 
law enforcement, and (3) the procedural aspects of prosecuting 
immigration violations have taken on many of the earmarks of 
criminal procedure.”160   
Crimmigration is manifested through new federally created 
categories of criminal behavior with severe immigration 
consequences including “aggravated felonies”—offenses that may not 
otherwise be felonies and may involve no acts of violence and serve 

157. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path Of Immigration Law: Asymmetric 
Incorporation Of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471 (2007) 
(observing that it is no longer rare for asylum seekers to be prosecuted for illegal entry into the 
United States); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 137 (2009) (observing that immigration issues are now a 
matter for the criminal justice system).   
158. The literature on crimmigration law is abundant; nearly two hundred law review 
articles address the topic. See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note 154; Legomsky, supra note 157; 
Chacón, supra note 157; Jennifer Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal 
of the “Criminal Street Gang Member”, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317 (2007);  Daniel Kanstroom, 
Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of 
Law”, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639 (2004); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries 
Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 81 
(2005); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010); Allegra 
M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2011). The issue has been analyzed in books and articles in related fields.  
See, e.g., MARJORIE ZATZ, THE BORDERS OF PUNISHMENT: MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
SOCIAL EXCLUSION (Katja Franko Aas & Mary Bosworth eds., 2013). One legal scholar 
maintains a useful crimmigration law blog. See CRIMMIGRATION.COM, created and maintained 
by César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, and the topic is now the discrete subject of academic 
conferences and law school seminars. See, e.g., Crimmigration Law & Policy Workshop: 
Immigration Detainers, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER STURM COLLEGE OF LAW,  
http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/constitutional-rights-and-remedies/crimmigration-law-
policy-workshop (last visited Oct. 27, 2015); Course Catalog: Crimmigration: The 
Intersection of Criminal Law and Immigration Law Clinical Seminar, HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL,  http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/index.html?o=66096 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
159. Stumpf, supra note 154, at 376.  
160. Id. at 381. 
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to increase the numbers of people deportable.161 In addition, federal 
laws that apply retroactively have created a new category of 
“immigration crimes” for acts once considered civil immigration-
related infractions that now carry increased criminal penalties.162  
Immigrants are now not only subject to removal on new and 
expanded grounds, they are also subjected to the mechanisms of the 
criminal justice system before their departure.163   
As a result of crimmigration, the vernacular structure of the 
criminal justice system has been extended to immigration matters.164  
That the melding of criminal and immigration law occurred during the 
rise of the “carceral state” facilitated the opportunities to criminalize 
immigrants including those lawfully residing in the United States.165  
Federal prosecutorial resources have been marshaled to seek the 
removal of the unauthorized immigrants.166 The United States, as one 
study has determined, “spends more on immigration enforcement 
agencies than on all its other principal criminal federal law 
enforcement agencies combined.”167 Immigration enforcement 
“represents the federal government’s most extensive and costly law 

161. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440, 
110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (1996); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (1994); see also Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., 
§ 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(F)-(G) (2000)) (expanding the definition of an aggravated felony to include an 
offense which carried a one-year sentence). 
162. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, §§ 108, 
213, 215, 324. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández identifies many of the particular legal 
reforms through which these changes occurred; see García Hernández, supra note 153, 1468; 
Ben Bowling, Epilogue: The Borders of Punishment: Towards a Criminology of Mobility, in 
THE BORDERS OF PUNISHMENT: MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 291, 294 
(Katja Franko Aas & Mary Bosworth eds., 2013). 
163. Bowling, supra note 162. 
164. Jonathan Simon, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 4 (2007) (discussing the use of 
“technologies, discourses, and metaphors of crime and criminal justice” outside of the criminal 
justice system). 
165. Garcia Hernández, supra note 153, at 1502. 
166. See CHAVEZ, supra note 132, at 3, 25; Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: 
Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 
1838-39 (2007); Michelle Waslin, New Data Shows Government Prioritizes Immigration 
Prosecutions over Dangerous Crime, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (June 30, 2011) 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2011/06/30/new-data-shows-government-
prioritizesimmigration-prosecutions-over-dangerous-crime/. 
167. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 9 (2013), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-
formidable-machinery. 
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enforcement endeavor.”168 Crimmigration law relies on “intelligence 
gathering and surveillance; policing and law enforcement; a 
specialized legal process, courts, and tribunals; and detention centres, 
prisons, and other means of ‘disposing’ of cases.”169 As one scholar 
has observed, crimmigration law has created its own “migration-
control industry” in the United States that parallels binational military 
strategies in Mexico.170   
The convergence of criminal and immigration law, however, has 
not resulted in additional constitutional protections for immigrants in 
immigration proceedings. For example, immigration status—
“appearance of Mexican ancestry”—is deemed a relevant factor in 
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists for investigating a 
violation of immigration law.171 Thus, while Mexicans—and all 
Latino-appearing individuals—are more likely to be subjected to 
searches and seizures, which can then trigger removal procedures, 
they have limited Fourth Amendment protections to challenge 
unlawful police practices in immigration court.172 Nor do they have a 
right to counsel at the expense of the state notwithstanding the US 
Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that deportation is “the equivalent 
of banishment or exile.”173 
Crimmigration law has had grave consequences for Mexicans 
whose identity has been conflated with “illegality” and 
“criminality.”174 Mexicans are profoundly and disproportionately 
affected by, if not the focus of, new legal arrangements.175 They 
comprise the largest group of foreign nationals with a historically 
well-established home community in the United States while 
maintaining patterns of migration circularity.176 New harsh 

168. Id. at 13. 
169. Id.; David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 159 (2012) (noting that a “vast network of administrative holding 
facilities has emerged for individuals accused of immigration violations . . . operating at the 
federal, state, and local levels.”). 
170. Bowling, supra note 162, at 293. 
171. United States v. Brignoni-Price, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975). 
172. Carbado & Harris, supra note 108, at 1549. 
173. Padilla v. Kentucky, 550 U.S. 356, 373 (2010). 
174. See CHAVEZ, supra note 132, at 3, 25; Chacón, supra note 166, at 1843. 
175. Kevin Johnson & David Fitzgerald, Mexican Migration and the Field of Law, in 
BEYOND LA FRONTERA: THE HISTORY OF MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION 179, 192 (Mark 
Overmyer-Velázquez ed., 2011) (describing illegal immigration as the “Mexican problem”).  
176. See SHARON PICKERING ET AL., THE CRIMINOLOGY OF MOBILITY 18 (2014), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2451108 (noting that Latinos comprise over 90% of 
immigrants held in detention, 94% of those removed). 
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crimmigration laws have disrupted their families and economies.177  
As an ethnic and racialized group, they have been subjected to 
“‘aggressive migration control tactics.’”178 Mexicans are most likely 
to be criminally prosecuted for unlawful entry and benefit the least 
from the exercise of agency discretion which would allow them to 
avoid deportation.179 A recent UN High Commissioner on Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) report found that Mexican immigrant children suffer 
comparative disadvantage under the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act and are entitled to fewer avenues of legal relief than other 
children who come across the border as unaccompanied minors.180  
According to the UN Report, “in all sectors (of the border) visited, 
C[ustoms] and B[order] P[atrol] communicated to UNHCR that 
Mexican unaccompanied alien children are always returned to 
Mexico.”181    
Crimmigration law, moreover, must be considered in the context 
of other federal laws that serve to create hardship in the day-to-day 
lives of migrants. Laws such as the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act exclude immigrants from almost all 
forms of government assistance programs.182 Immigrants are denied 
civil legal assistance from federally funded legal services programs, 
the mainstay of legal aid for the poor, leaving them vulnerable to 
additional exploitation by landlords, employers, creditors, and others 
who may be conscious of their anomaly status with regard to legal 

177. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text; see also DOROTHEE SCHNEIDER, 
CROSSING BORDERS: MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY UNITED 
STATES 238–39 (2011). 
178. García Hernández, supra note 153, at 1491. 
179. Juliet P. Stumpf, The Process is the Punishment in Crimmigration Law, in THE 
BORDERS OF PUNISHMENT: MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION, supra note 
158, at 58, 62 (describing the prosecutorial requirements of Operation Streamline on the US- 
Mexico border); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1704 
n.115 (2009) (citing to DHS guidance which restricted border and ICE agents’ and instituting  
“‘zero-tolerance’” along the US-Mexican border). 
180. Under the 2008 Trafficking Victims Protection and Reauthorization Act, Congress 
sought to restrict the opportunities that the law presented for Mexican children and developed 
a quick screen process applicable to only those children from Mexico or Canada. Of course, 
there are no statistics demonstrating that children come from Canada and thus the law was 
clearly designed to disadvantage Mexican children. See Dara Lind, The Process that Congress 
Wants to Use for Child Migrants is a Disaster, VOX (July 15, 2014), http://www.vox.com/
2014/7/15/5898349/border-children-mexican-central-american-deport-quickly-2008-law.  
181. Id. 
182. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2262. 
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remedy.183 These laws create incentives for Mexicans to self-deport as 
an alternative to a life lived in the shadows or in a detention center 
awaiting legal process.  
  ii.  The “Mexican-as-Criminal” Factor and Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform  
Immigration reform has been debated in the context of the global 
political economy, national security interests, and electoral concerns.  
Proposals for comprehensive immigration reform (“CIR”) that might 
accomplish pathways to legal status for undocumented immigrants in 
the United States came to the fore in 2004, when Senators Edward 
Kennedy and John McCain and Congressmen Luis Gutierrez and Jeff 
Flake unsuccessfully introduced a comprehensive package to amend 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).184 Additional efforts to 
reform immigration were subsequently proposed in 2006 but were 
largely rejected.185 In 2013, Congress again undertook the task of 
amending the INA. The Senate passed the “Border Security, 
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,”—
Senate Bill 744 of 2013—and currently there are a number of House 
bills pending.186 
Border enforcement looms large in the context of CIR. It is the 
prevailing emphasis of the Senate bill, the majority of House bills, as 
well as President Obama’s framework for reform, notwithstanding the 
complexity of comprehensive immigration reform and the multiple 

183. Pub. L. No. 97-276, §122, 96 Stat. 1186, 1194-95 (1982); see Omnibus 
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §504(a)(11), 
110 Stat. 1321, 1354-55; Restrictions on Legal Assistance to Aliens, 61 Fed. Reg. 45, 750 
(Aug. 29, 1996).   
184. This Article limits its review of immigration reform to recent initiatives. See Mary 
Giovagnoli, Overhauling Immigration Law: A Brief History and Basic Principles of Reform, 
IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/
perspectives/overhauling-immigration-law-brief-history-and-basic-principles-reform.  
185. Id. But see infra note 199 and accompanying text.  
186. See  Special Report: A Guide to S.744: Understanding the 2013 Senate 
Immigration Bill, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (July 10, 2013), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/guide-s744-understanding-2013-senate-
immigration-bill (analyzing S. 744); What’s On The Menu? Immigration Bills Pending in the 
House of Representatives in 2014, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/what%E2%80%99s-menu-immigration-bills-
pending-house-representatives-2014 (listing and analyzing House Bills pending); see also Side 
by Side Comparison of 2013 Senate Immigration Bill with Individual 2013 House Bills, 
MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Aug. 2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/side-
side-comparison-2013-senate-immigration-bill-individual-2013-house-bills.  
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issues that must be addressed.187 Congressional proposals seek to 
marshal federal resources estimated to be in excess of US$40 billion 
to double the size of the border patrol, to pay for troops at the border, 
and for the costs of military surveillance equipment, 700 miles of 
fencing, and drones.188 Both S. 744 and H.R. 1417 require 
“‘[s]ituational awareness’ of the entire southwest border; meaning 
100 percent surveillance” and “‘[o]perational control’ of the entire 
southwest border; meaning that at least 90 percent of all unauthorized 
entries into the United States are deterred.”189 Many of these 
provisions, particularly those found in S. 744, function as “triggers” 
or benchmarks which must be realized before undocumented 
immigrants already in the United States might begin the process of 
legalization, and before the operationalizing of other structural 
reforms that might allow immigrants seeking entry to lawfully 
migrate.190 House versions of CIR would require an increase in 
detention of immigrants and a further expansion of crimes defined as 
“aggravated felonies.”191   
Testimony offered by opponents of CIR routinely invoke the 
danger of Mexican cartels, gun and drug-traffickers from Mexico 
infiltrating the country, and insist that there is a war at the border. 192 

187. Id.; Daniel I. Morales, Immigration Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 49, 54 n.24 (2013) (noting that “the Obama administration's framework for 
immigration reform and that of the bipartisan group of senators includes more border 
enforcement.”); Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky? Thoughts 
on Implementation and Future Directions, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 371 (2011) (observing 
that President Obama, notwithstanding his support for CIR, “has targeted its enforcement 
efforts and rhetoric against ‘criminal aliens’”). Of course, there are a number of progressive 
reform proposals in the bills. See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, The Senate Immigration Bill: Here’s 
What You Need to Know, WASH. POST, (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/16/the-senate-immigration-bill-heres-what-you-need-to-know/.  
188. Justin Feldman, A Raw Deal An Anti-Immigrant Bill Masked as Reform, COUNTER 
PUNCH (June 26, 2014), http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/26/an-anti-immigrant-bill-
masked-as-reform/; see also Side by Side Comparison, supra note 186. 
189. Jennifer M. Chacón, Policing Immigration After Arizona, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & 
POL'Y 231, 234, n.19 (2013); Morales, supra note 187, at 70-72; An Unlikely Couple: The 
Similar Approaches to Border Enforcement in H.R. 1417 and S. 744, IMMIGRATION 
POLICY CENTER (July 24, 2013), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/unlikely-
couple-similar-approaches-border-enforcement-hr-1417-and-s-744.  
190. See An Unlikely Couple, supra note 189. 
191. Cracking the Safe Act: Understanding the Impact and Context of H.R. 2278, The 
“Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement Act”, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (2013) 
(analyzing H.R. 2278 §§ 106, 301(a), 307(a), 309).   
192. See Roll Call, Inc. Verbatim Transcript, House of Representatives, Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Comm. Hearing, Rep. Robert W. Goodlatte Holds a Hearing on the Strengthen and 
Fortify Enforcement Act, June 13, 2013, 2013 WL 2951093 (testimony of sheriffs from 
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CIR adversaries warn of kidnaping and extortion at the hands of 
Mexican criminals inside the United States.193 CIR hearings include 
sorrowful testimony by parents whose children were tragically killed 
by “illegal alien gang members from Mexico with a history of 
violence” or an “illegal immigrant in a pickup truck who had two 
drunken driving convictions but was not in possession of a driver's 
license.”194 They “steal” jobs from Americans. Prior versions of the 
INA have been deemed too soft with regard to undocumented 
Mexican workers whose unauthorized stays have grown longer over 
time, and justify calls for greater enforcement mechanisms.195
In order to protect against Mexican criminals, elected officials 
argue for a version of CIR that would triple the number of border 
patrol agents on the US-Mexico border.196  Senator John McCain 
supported such CIR proposals, stating, “[w]e'll be the most militarized 
border since the fall of the Berlin Wall.”197 Indeed, the rhetoric serves 
the interests of those who would profit from a further increase in 
border enforcement, including private prison contractors who build 
and house immigrant detainees, as well as corporations with contracts 
to produce the border military and surveillance technology.198 The 

Arizona and North Carolina referencing the need for armed soldiers and double fencing at the 
US-Mexico border); Roll Call, Inc., Verbatim Transcript, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Comm. Hearing, Sen. Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Markup on the Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, Part Two May 9, 2013, 2013 WL 1930088 
(calling attention to the “spike” in criminal activity at the Mexican border). 
193. Roll Call, Inc., Verbatim Transcript, House of Representatives, Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Comm. Hearing, Rep. Robert W. Goodlatte Holds a Hearing on the Immigration 
Reform an193d Control Act of 1986, May 22, 2013, 2013 WL 2299208. 
194. Roll Call, Inc., Robert W. Goodlatte Holds a Hearing on the Strengthen and Fortify 
Enforcement Act, June 13, 2013, 2013 WL 2951093 (statement of Mr. Jamiel Shaw); id. 
(statement of Ms. Sabine Durbin). 
195. See Goodlatte Holds a Hearing on the Immigration Reform and Control Act, supra 
note 193. 
196. See Sen. Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Markup on the Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, supra note 192 (statement of Sen. Cruz). 
197. McCain: 'Most Militarized Border Since Berlin Wall', HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/26/mccain-border-berlin-wall_n_3503261.
html. 
198.  Eric Lipton, As Wars End, a Rush to Grab Dollars at the Border, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 7, 2013, at A1 (noting that the nation’s largest military contractors were expecting to 
collect billions of dollars if immigration reform passed and reporting on their lobbyists as 
pushing for immigration reform); see Chris Kirkham, Private Prisons Profit From 
Immigration Crackdown, Federal and Local Law Enforcement Partnerships, HUFF. POST 
(June 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/private-prisons-immigration-
federal-law-enforcement_n_1569219.html (noting the increasing numbers of immigrants in 
private detention centers). 
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only bill to be approved in 2006 authorized the funding of the 
construction of a wall across 670 miles of the US-Mexico border.199 
Congressional debates about CIR reflect, as they construct, 
discriminatory attitudes against Mexican immigrants. One study 
found that US citizens not only “conflate immigrants in general with 
illegal immigrants” but they also “treat illegal immigrants from 
Mexico differently than those from other regions of the world.”200 As 
Gerald López has written, “[a]lmost everyone… sees undocumented 
Mexicans as convincing proof that something is ‘broken’—in the 
United States and in Mexico.”201 
C. State and Local:  Concerns of Place Converge with Law 
1. The Narrative: Threatened, Unwelcomed, and Marginalized 
Anti-Mexican rhetoric serves to facilitate the socio-legal 
exclusion and physical expulsion of immigrants at the state and local 
levels. “Invaders” who crossed the border are now intruders who have 
entered the familiar places of the local. Public officials, local law 
enforcement, and worried citizens evoke “the fabled imagery of 
‘Small Town, USA,’202 now subject to ruin and fear that the influx of 
Mexicans will undermine the existing social order, local culture, and 
local values.”203  
In towns and cities across much of the United States, the 
subordinating narrative tends to focus on crime, threats to the 

199. See Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638-40 (2006) (codified 
as 8 U.S.C. § 1103 & 14 U.S.C. § 637) (authorizing the construction of a fence and greater 
monitoring of the US-Mexican border); Robert A. Pastor, Speed Bumps, Potholes, and 
Roadblocks on the North American Superhighway, 19 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 9, 12 (2013); J. 
Brian Johns, Filling the Void: Incorporating International Human Rights Protections into 
United States Immigration Policy, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 541, 550 (2013) (noting that immigration 
reform has focused on securing the southern border with Mexico).  
200. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration 
Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2074, 2145 (2013) (citing a study based on a 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study. 
201. Gerald P. López , Don't We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1711, 1715 
(2012); see also Johnson, supra note 142, at 584, 610 (noting the use of hyperbole and false 
accusations particularly targeted at Mexico and Mexicans as a means to influence immigration 
reform). 
202. See Jamie G. Longazel, Rhetorical Barriers to Mobilizing for Immigrant Rights: 
White Innocence and Latina/o Abstraction, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 580, 590 (2014). 
203. Id. at 584. Residents of Hazelton, PA also claimed that immigrants were “tarnishing 
a legacy.” Id. at 593. 
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economy, and racial upheaval.204 Indeed, anti-immigrant activity has 
been characterized as most virulent at the local level.205 Mexicans are 
the new social problem who threaten to overwhelm public education, 
exhaust public coffers, endanger health, harm the elderly, take from 
veterans, and compromise the very safety of community residents.206  
Community health providers often consider immigrants “undeserving 
patients” who “drain” the system.207 They are deemed unwilling to 
assimilate as evidenced by their continued use of the Spanish 
language.208 Their immigrant status provides the basis to characterize 
their presenceas a nuisance if not illegal.209 These narratives exploit 
economic uncertainty and individual insecurity which are the 
principal threats perceived by long-term residents when newcomers 
arrive in their communities.210 
Fear enters the public imagination in the form of concrete 
problems: Mexicans drive illegally, establish businesses illegally, rent 
homes illegally, obtain bank loans illegally, and attend school 
illegally or otherwise drop out and thus become a social menace. 211  

204. Gabriel Sanchez et al., Filling the Void: Factors Leading to Punitive 
Immigration Policy Across the American States, W. POL. SCI. ASS'N, Working Paper, at 5 
(2012), available at  http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/sanchezgabriel.pdf. 
205. Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona-Immigrants Out!: Assessing 
"Dystopian Dreams" and "Usable Futures" of Immigration Reform, and Considering Whether 
"Immigration Regionalism" Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 5 
(2010). 
206. Longazel, supra note 202, at 586, 593 (e.g., burdening the city of Hazelton, PA, 
with requests for interpreters, crashing various governmental support systems). 
207. Meredith Glenn Cabell, Mexican Immigrant Integration in the U.S. Southeast: 
Institutional Approaches to Immigrant Integration in Owensboro, Kentucky, THE CTR. 
COMP. IMMIGRATION STUD., Working Paper 153, at 41 (2007) (finding such attitudes despite 
studies demonstrating  that Mexican immigrants generally pay more often than their US citizen 
counterparts).   
208. See James H. Johnson, Jr. et al., A Profile of Hispanic Newcomers to North 
Carolina, POPULAR GOV'T 5 (Fall 1999) (describing hostility towards Spanish speaking 
newcomers). 
209. A number of local ordinances have been enacted to abate the “nuisance of illegal 
immigration.” See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, Illegal Immigration Relief Act 
Ordinance (Sept. 21, 2006); City of Valley Park, Missouri, Ordinance Relating to Illegal 
Immigration, Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance No. 1708 (2006). 
210. See Heather M. Creek & Stephen Yoder, With a Little Help from Our Feds: 
Understanding State Immigration Enforcement Policy Adoption in American Federalism, 40 
POL’Y STUD. J. 647, 678 (2012) (explaining group theory conflict in the context of local 
immigration concerns). 
211. Lisa García Bedolla & Claire Jean Kim, Beyond Whiteness, Asian Americans and 
Latinos in U.S. Educational Discourse, in THE NATION AND ITS PEOPLES, CITIZENS, 
DENIZENS, MIGRANTS, 95, 102-103 (John S.W. Park & Shannon Gleeson eds., 2014) 
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They “steal” jobs from local residents. Mexicans serve as scapegoats 
and they are blamed for much of what often ails local communities.  
The rhetoric is vitriolic. After the tragic murder of three teenagers in 
Newark, New Jersey attributed to “illegal aliens” one politician 
stated, “[t]welve million illegal immigrants later, we are now living in 
a nation that is beset by people who are suicidal maniacs and want to 
kill countless innocent men, women, and children around the 
world.”212 In North Carolina, the President of Americans for Legal 
Immigration Political Action Committee had this to say about 
immigrants in his state: “[y]ou're dealing with a criminal culture that 
where they're from, no one ever gets charged . . . . Many illegal 
immigrants have a rape and pillage mentality.”213 Words often imply 
deeds:  one local anti-immigrant group urged its members to come to 
a rally organized by and for Mexican day laborers and to bring 
baseball bats, stating, “‘if we’re lucky, we’re gonna need them.’”214  
Another proponent of anti-immigration legislation suggested that the 
problem of illegal immigration could be solved by “empty[ing] the 
clip.”215 Minutemen volunteers arrive at designated locations to 
“‘hunt Mexicans’” while wearing t-shirts that read “‘Some people are 
alive simply because it is illegal to kill them.’”216  
On the other hand, the Mexican-as-criminal narrative often 
serves as an important source of additional revenue. In North 
Carolina, a county commissioner noted the importance of 
undocumented immigrants whose capture promised to help maintain 

(describing the under-educational achievement of children who need help from the “outside” 
to achieve); see Aoki & Shuford, supra note 205, at 14-15. 
212. Sampson, supra note at 151, at 29 (quoting Fred Thompson). 
213. Bertrand M. Gutierrez, Immigrant Data Shatters Crime Misconception, WINSTON-
SALEM J. (Nov. 6, 2011), http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/immigrant-data-shatter-
crime-misconceptions/article_d61bf28b-f297-5552-a1fc-090eba16b4d0.html. Texas Governor 
Rick Perry recently made wildly inaccurate statements about crime and immigrants from 
Mexico and Central America. See Walter Ewing, Texas Governor Invokes Nonsensical 
Statistics On Immigrant Crime in His State, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/08/05/texas-governor-invokes-nonsensical-statistics-on-
immigrant-crime-in-his-state/.  
214. Monica W. Varsanyi, Neoliberalism and Nativism, Local Anti-Immigrant Policy 
Activism and an Emerging Politics of Scale, 35 INT’L. J. URB. REGIONAL RES., 295-302 
(2010). 
215. On the Rise in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.13, 2011, at A28.  
216. Id. at 141; see also William Arrocha, From Arizona's S.B. 1070 to Georgia's H.B. 
87 and Alabama's H.B. 56: Exacerbating the Other and Generating New Discourses and 
Practices of Segregation, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 245, 246 (2012) (describing calls on the Neo-
Nazi National Socialist Movement by the Minutemen to “launch a campaign of violence” 
against illegal immigrants—Hispanics). 
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jail revenues.217 In Phoenix, the Public Safety Manager falsely 
inflated the number of kidnappings related to Mexican criminals in 
order to qualify for grant funds to enhance resources used to remove 
Mexicans.218   
At the local level, policy entrepreneurs invoke the transnational 
and national anti-immigrant discourse to manipulate fears about 
Mexicans.219 They have called for local citizens to take up the war 
against “illegal” Mexican immigrants as much to protest the “failed” 
federal policies as to defend against “dangerous invaders.”220 These 
individuals are often politicians, or other political actors who enter 
into local spaces “with singular focus” to repackage and reapply 
nativist concerns to achieve progress on an agenda unrelated to local 
concerns.221  Anti-immigrant sentiment is often “largely the product 
of political partisanship” designed to create a micro-politics to 
convince localities that their particular community concerns are 
linked to a national restrictionist agenda.222 In their empirical study on 
policy entrepreneurs and local immigration policies, S. Karthick 
Ramakrishnan and Pratheepan Gulasekaram demonstrate that at a 
state and local level, a restrictionist response to immigration: 
is not a simple matter of homegrown solutions to persistent and 
thorny local problems, as legislators often portray the issue. 
Instead, it often involves sponsorship and expertise from outside 
actors, who make critical choices on venues based on political 
opportunities (large Republican majorities in the legislature and a 

217. Chris Lavender, Empty cells: Inmate population down at jail, TIMES-NEWS (June 
19, 2011), http://www.thetimesnews.com/news/population-45104-down-empty.html.  
218. Marc Lacey, Arizona: Phoenix Public Safety Chief Is Suspended, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 4, 2011, at A14; Monica Alonzo, Police Chief Jack Harris is Retiring—Again, 
PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Apr. 15, 2011), http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/valleyfever/
2011/04/phoenix_police_chief_jack_harr_2.php. 
219. For an overview of the use of the term “entrepreneur” in social and political 
economic contexts, see David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 283, 300-05 (2008). For a review of the term “policy entrepreneur” (or issue 
entrepreneurs) as more specifically related to anti-immigrant sentiment, see generally S. 
Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of The Political in 
Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431 (2012). 
220. CHAVEZ, supra note 132, at 132-34. 
221. Pozen, supra note 219, at 301-02. 
222. Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 219, at 1434. The authors note that 
political partisanship is more likely to produce restrictionist policies in localities that are more 
heavily Republican than Democrat. Id. at 1440; Creek & Yoder, supra note 210, at 679 
(observing that local restrictionist policies are often driven by outsiders and elites); Charis E. 
Kubrin et al., Introduction, in PUNISHING IMMIGRANTS, supra note 67, at 1, 4 (noting that 
politicians and commentators proclaim the need to control illegal Mexicans).  
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Republican governor), to build a case for the necessity and 
constitutionality of subfederal action.223   
National media stories are reframed to incite local suspicion and 
scorn.224 Political maneuvering finds fertile ground in localities with 
deeply held nativist sentiments that prevent local residents from 
imagining immigrants as members of the community.225 Incidents of 
nativist hostility have been reported in all regions of the United 
States.226 Communities that tend to live and work in racially stratified 
circumstances, with limited contact to persons from different 
backgrounds, are especially susceptible to anti-Mexican sentiments.227 
Fear mongering has taken particular hold in the South, a region of the 
country where increasing arrival of Latinos has resulted in a 
significant demographic shift.228 Immigrants are disadvantaged by the 
South’s preference for a common culture and a cultural construction 
of daily life as local concerns mediated through long-term personal 

223. Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 219, at 1457 (citations omitted). 
224. See Cabell, supra note 207, at 50 (describing how media personalities like Lou 
Dobbs and Rush Limbaugh contributed to the stereotyping of Mexican immigrants in one local 
town in Kentucky). 
225. Leo Chavez, Outside the Imagined Community: Undocumented Settlers and 
Experiences of Incorporation, 18 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 257, 259 (1991). 
226. There is need to avoid the phenomenon of “internal orientalism” that burdens the 
South. See David R. Jansson, The Haunting of the South: American Geopolitical Identity and 
the Burden of Southern History, 12 GEOPOLITICS 400, 407 (2007).  
227. Kevin O’Neill & Marta Tienda, A Tale of Two Counties: Natives’ Opinions Toward 
Immigration in North Carolina, 44 INT’L. MIGRATION REV. 728, 756 (2010) (noting that 
residents with greater interaction with immigrants might account for a more welcoming 
attitude); L. Jason Anastasopoulos, (When) Race Matters: How Undocumented Immigrant 
Race and Place Shape Immigration Policy Attitudes, (Oct. 1, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462349 (demonstrating that individuals experience heightened anti-
immigrant and racist sentiments when Mexican immigrants reside in their city); see Patricia L. 
Price, Race and ethnicity: Latino/a Immigrants and Emerging Geographies of Race and Place 
in the USA, 36 PROGRESS HUM. GEO. 800, 803 (2011) (noting that as a historical matter, as a 
region, the South has been more insulated than others with little exposure to Latino/a 
immigrants). One study focusing on the South from 1994 to 2008 found that Southerners 
consistently supported measures for decreasing immigration more than residents of any other 
US region. See Krista Perriera, Mexican Families in North Carolina: The Socio-Historical 
Contexts of Exit and Settlement, 51 SE. GEOGRAPHER 260, 276 (2011). 
228. Johnson, supra note 208, at 2. The term “gateway communities” refers to border 
areas or other places where immigrants first enter and settle—for example, Los Angeles, 
California. See Francis Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law in Globalizing Labor Markets, 1 U. PA. J. 
LABOR & EMP’T L. 369, 397 (1998). Communities with large concentrations of immigrants are 
often at the center of the immigration debate which reflects nativist anxieties: whether “these 
others/outsiders cost ‘us’ more than ‘they’ contribute.” Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, 
Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First Century, 23 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075, 1095 (1996). 
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relationships tied to place.229 More Southerners—mostly white 
Southerners—than individuals from any other region express that they 
are “strongly opposed” to living in neighborhoods where Latinos 
comprised half or more of the residents.230   
 North Carolina has been especially impacted by changing 
demographics and has provided a case study for many scholars 
examining the convergence of place and anti-immigrant sentiment.231  
A University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Journalism 
poll confirmed rising anxiety and distrust of Latino newcomers with 
particular resentment towards those with limited English-speaking 
skills.232 Approximately two-thirds of respondents indicated an 
unwillingness to welcome them into their neighborhoods.233 Hate 
groups have become active in the state’s anti-immigrant organizing 
and are brazen in their anti-immigrant rhetoric.234 In 2009, a group 
that calls itself NC FIRE that seeks to “educate American citizens 
who turn a blind eye to the many costly and destructive aspects of 

229. Jansson, supra note 226, at 408. 
230. Id. 
231. North Carolina has been the focus on many studies on this issue. See Hannah Gill & 
Deborah M. Weissman, Adapting to a Plural Culture and the Future of the South, in A WAY 
FORWARD: BUILDING A GLOBALLY COMPETITIVE SOUTH 173 (Daniel P. Gitterman & Peter A. 
Coclanis eds., 2011). From 1990 to 2000, the state had the fastest growing Latino population, 
most of whom are Mexican. The 2010 census numbers revealed a 110% growth in the Latino 
population, which now makes up 8.4% of the state's total population. Id.; Christina M. 
Rodriguez, The Significance  of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 
584-88 (2008); Marie C. Scott, Resegregation, Language, and Educational Opportunity: The 
Influx of Latino Students Into North Carolina Public Schools, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 123 
(2008); Lisa R. Pruitt, Latino/as, Locality, and Law in the Rural South, 2 HARV. LATINO L. 
REV. 135 (2008); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1619, 1654-77 (2008); Kathleen Ann Griesbach, Local-Federal Immigration 
Enforcement in North Carolina: Mapping the Criminal Immigration Overlap, 2011 
NORTEAMÉRICA: REVISTA ACADÉMICA DEL CISAN-UNAM 191; Raymond A. Mohl, The 
Latino Migration Experience in North Carolina: New Roots in the Old North State, 88 N.C. 
HIST. REV. 434 (2011); Owen J. Furuseth & Heather A. Smith, Localized Immigration Policy: 
The View From Charlotte, North Carolina, A New  Immigrant Gateway, in TAKING LOCAL 
CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES 173–91 (Monica 
Varsanyi ed., 2010).     
232. Johnson, supra note 208, at 9. 
233. Id.  
234. Reports have documented an alarming rise in the Ku Klux Klan’s once-diminishing 
numbers as fears over illegal immigration are exploited. North Carolina has grown from 
twenty-seven to thirty-five extremist groups, including eight Klan chapters with illegal 
immigration at the top of the list of concerns. Franco Ordoqez, More Joining Hate Groups, 
NEWS AND OBSERVER, Feb. 12, 2007, at 4B (quoting the imperial wizard of the Mount 
Holly-based chapter of the Klan in Gaston County who says he has not seen membership grow 
so fast since the 1960s, when he joined).  
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illegal immigration, including the 8 Ways Illegals Make You Sick” 
organized against a county deemed to be too soft on immigration 
enforcement, and solicited groups as the N.C. Minuteman Patriots and 
the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps to become involved in their anti-
immigrant efforts.235 In August 2014, a spokesman for the North 
Carolina branch of the Ku Klux Klan stated his belief that “the 
situation at the US-Mexico border with people attempting to enter the 
United States [is] . . . a ‘land war.’ ‘I think we should have our troops 
there with a shoot-to-kill policy,’” he said. “‘These people are 
obviously not getting the picture that we don’t want them here.’”236  
Political actors are unabashed in their hostility toward Mexicans.  
One sheriff complained about the newly arriving undocumented 
Mexicans, claiming that they were more likely to commit crimes than 
other residents in the area.237 He made brazenly racist claims to the 
news media about Mexicans, stating, “‘[t]heir values are a lot 
different—their morals—than what we have here . . . . In Mexico, 
there’s nothing wrong with having sex with a 12-, 13-year-old girl . . . 
. They do a lot of drinking down in Mexico.’”238 The president of the 
North Carolina Sheriffs’ Association claimed that Mexicans were 
“trashy,” that they “breed [. . .] like rabbits,” and that they “rape, rob 
and murder’ American citizens.”239 He claimed to be fulfilling the 
requests of the residents of his county and maintained that everywhere 
he went, “people say, ‘Sheriff, what are we going to do about all these 
Mexicans?’”240 As one immigrant advocate recently noted, the 
methods used by anti-immigrant forces are emblematic of those 
strategies relied on by Southern segregationists in the past.241 

235. Taylor Sisk, Conservative Group, ICE Supporters Clash in Chatham, THE 
CARRBORO CITIZEN (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.carrborocitizen.com/main/2009/03/05/
conservative-group-ice-supporters-clash-in-chatham/#more-5083.  
236. Jordan Green, Grand Dragon Says Troy is the True Location of Klan Rally, TRIAD 
CITY BEAT (Aug. 8, 2014), http://triad-city-beat.com/grand-dragon-says-true-location-of-
klan-rally-is-troy/.  
237. Kristin Collins, Tolerance Wears Thin, NEWS & OBSERVER (Sept. 4, 2008), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/immigration/story/1209646.html.  
238. Id.  
239. Id. 
240. Id.  
241. Patrick O’Neill, 287(g) Law Has Echoes in Jim Crow Era, GREENSBORO NEWS & 
RECORD (May 31, 2009), http://www.news-record.com/content/2009/05/28/article/patrick_
oneill_287g_law_has_echoes_in_jim_crow_era. 
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2. The Organizing Principles of Local Law in Response to 
Nativism: Hardship and Exclusion 
At the local level, law replicates transnational and national 
perspectives:  it transmits notions of the Mexican-as-criminal and in 
circular fashion, reconstitutes the narrative. State and local anti-
immigrant legislation has dramatically increased. The most notable 
example is Arizona’s SB 1070, a law intended to make life difficult 
for immigrants, that is, mostly Mexican immigrants.242 The Act was 
the fruition of a distorted narrative that portrayed parts of Arizona 
under siege from Mexican criminals.243 It is now known that at the 
signing of Arizona’s controversial immigration bill, Governor Jan 
Brewer, as a means of justification for the bill, falsely claimed that 
decapitated heads had been found within the state and declared, “[w]e 
cannot sacrifice our safety to the murderous greed of drug cartels.”244  
Much of the law was struck down as unconstitutional by the US 
Supreme Court. 245 But SB 1070 was not Arizona’s only effort to send 
a message to Mexicans that they were unwelcome.246 In addition to a 
myriad of other bills, including one that sought to end birthright 
citizenship, Arizona enacted legislation to ban ethnic studies and shut 
down Mexican-American studies programs, claiming that the 
programs were “brainwashing” students and promoting “Mexican 
solidarity.”247   
Arizona was not the only state to enact harsh laws focused onn 
the expulsion of immigrants. “Copycat” legislation was introduced in 

242. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at http://
www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf. The text of the bill included the following: 
“The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the 
public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.” Id.  
243. See Adalberto Aguirre, Arizona's SB1070, Latino Immigrants and the Framing of 
Anti-Immigrant Policies, 10 LATINO STUD. 385, 386 (2012). 
244. Governor Admits Error About Beheadings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, at A12 
(arguing that politicians in Arizona are “selling a vision of border chaos and violence 
disconnected from reality”). 
245. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, (2012). Notwithstanding the Court’s 
decision to clearly circumscribe the authority of the states to regulate immigration, it too made 
reference to the perception of Mexicans as criminals. Id. 
246. Aguirre, supra note 243, at 386. 
247. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §15-112 (2010); Marc Lacey, Rift in Arizona as Latino Class 
is Found Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 8, 2011, at A1; see Aguirre, supra note 243, at 388-40, for a 
description of additional bills proposed or enacted. For a fuller discussion of this law, see Yxta 
Maya Murray, Inflammatory Statehood, 30 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 227 (2014); 
Kevin Terry, Community Dreams and Nightmares: Arizona, Ethnic Studies, and the Continued 
Relevance of Derrick Bell's Interest-Convergence Thesis, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1483 (2013).  
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a number of states.248 One Alabama legislator promoted Alabama’s 
immigration enforcement law, described as “the cruelest in the 
nation”249 as one “designed to make it difficult for [Latinos] to live 
here so they will deport themselves.”250 Another Senator was more 
specific in articulating the purpose of the bill:  “. . . . these Mexicans . 
. . . [Y]ou all are trying to get as many in here out and trying to stop 
as many coming in [as you can] . . . .”251   
Local anti-immigrant laws might be described as a “legislative 
epidemic” that proceed to incorporate greater restrictionist provisions 
over time.252 The local politics of immigration do not always reflect 
the distorted narrative of Mexican-as-criminal, of course.253 But many 
localities have signed-on to local immigration enforcement programs 
such as 287(g) and Secured Communities (“S-Comm”) which shifted 
the power to exclude immigrants from the United States from the 

248. State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT'L CONFERENCE ON 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-laws-related-to-
immigration-and-immigrants.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Zatz & Smith, supra note 151, 
at 146; SB 1070 Four Years Later, Lessons Learned NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW 
CENTER  (2014), available at http://www.nilc.org/sb1070fouryearslater.html; see Aoki & 
Shuford, supra note 205, at 15-19. These laws have been largely successfully challenged in 
litigation. Id. For a comprehensive review of state and local immigration enforcement laws, 
see State and Local Enforcement, LEGAL ACTION CENTER,  
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/clearinghouse/litigation-issue-pages/state-and-local-law-
enforcement#AL (last visited Oct. 27, 2014);  ARIZONA AND THE NATIONAL IMMIGRATION 
CRISIS, http://libguides.law.ucla.edu/content.php?pid=129802&sid=1113372 (last visited Oct. 
27, 2014).  
249. The Nation’s Cruelest Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, at A22. 
250. No Way to Live, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/node/103511/section/2. 
251. See Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Robert Bentley, ACLU, available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/1-0_complaint.pdf.  
252. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal 
Laws That Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3, 7 (2010) (describing the 
phenomenon of a slew of legislative initiatives motivated by the dedicated group of people 
committed to enacting these laws, tragic stories to whip up support, as well as other political 
and legal factors that aid in their widespread promulgation). 
253. Some towns and cities provide opportunities for the inclusions of immigrants and 
create opportunities to devise policies that advance strategies of community integration. 
Recent debates about immigration enforcement have considered whether devolution to the 
local could result in positive outcomes for immigrants including local safe havens for the 
undocumented and opportunities for community-driven progressive policies. See Rick Su, 
Localist Reading of Local immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1633 (2008) 
(describing local immigration laws as an extension of local interests). Sanctuary cities and 
communities that have refused to sign on to local immigration enforcement mechanisms such 
as 287(g) or Secured Communities are examples of “progressive localist visions” that prefer 
integrative strategies with regard to newcomers. Aoki & Shuford, supra note 205, at 5. 
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exclusive control of the federal government to a shared arrangement 
with states and local governments.254 At the same time, localities have 
enacted subnational restrictions burdening the day-to-day lives of 
immigrants by denying them access to health care, employment, 
housing, and education.255 
Restrictionist laws and ordinances in the South match the 
region’s anti-immigrant rhetoric.256 Law enforcement agencies in the 
region have embraced local immigration enforcement programs more 
than any other area of the country.257 North Carolina once again 
serves as an example of the tendencies of new destination locations in 
the South. The state has the highest number of 287(g) programs, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Department of Justice has sued one 
of the first North Carolina 287(g) counties for violating the civil 
rights of Latinos.258 Local governments have piled on the resolutions, 
ordinances, and statutes in the name of keeping residents safe from 
Mexican immigrants. County resolutions have been enacted that call 
for the termination of funds for any local programs that serve “illegal 
residents,” and for the County Sheriff to “diligently battle the ever-

254. An amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) known as § 287(g) 
authorized the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to enter into agreements 
known as Memoranda of Agreement (“MOA”) with local law enforcement agencies that 
choose to enter into immigration enforcement activities. Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) ( “287(g)” refers to the statutory 
numbering of the Immigration and Nationality Act). For the government’s description of its 
Secured Communities program, see Immigration Enforcement: Secured Communities, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
255. See, e.g., Keith Aoki et al., (In)Visible Cities: Three Local Government Models and 
Immigration Regulation, 10 OR. REV. INT'L L. 453, 496-99 (2008). 
256. Zatz & Smith, supra note 151, at 146. 
257. The great majority of 287(g) agreements are in southern states. S-Comm is now 
mandatory throughout the United States, but a review of the government’s fact sheet showing 
activation dates demonstrates that southern states and its political subdivisions were among the 
first to sign on voluntarily. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) 
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Secured 
Communities, Activated Jurisdictions, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 
2014). 
258. Dep’t. of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Files Civil Rights Lawsuit 
Against the Alamance County, N.C., Sheriff’s Office (Dec. 20, 2012), available at  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crt-1534.html. The 287(g) program with 
Alamance county was terminated in the fall of 2012. See Billy Ball, DOJ Program ends 
Federal Immigration Program in Alamance County, INDYWEEK.COM (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/doj-ends-federal-immigration-program-in-alamance-
county/Content?oid=3157331.  
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increasing criminal element which is growing daily with the influx of 
illegal residents,”259 to limit city services to undocumented residents, 
and to increase all measures to enforce immigration laws.260 The town 
of Carrboro enacted an anti-lingering ordinance criminalizing day 
laborers, the overwhelming majority of whom were Mexican, who 
remained on the corner past 11:00 a.m., for fear that without limiting 
the association of Latino workers, the community would be plagued 
with criminal behavior.261   
Criminal justice practices reveal the ways in which Mexican 
immigrants have been unfairly targeted and unlawfully profiled due to 
perceptions of them as criminals.262 Racial profiling practices have 
been justified on the claim that Mexicans are known substance 
abusers.263 One North Carolina sheriff explicitly ordered his deputies 
to “go get them Mexicans” and to “lock up any damn Mexicans you 
can” during vehicle checkpoints.264 Another former deputy sheriff 
admitted that law enforcement officers in his county targeted 

259. Lindsey Nash, Expression by Ordinance: Preemption and Proxy in Local 
Legislation, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 243, 281 (2011); (NC Lincoln County Resolution, June 18, 
2007). 
260. Id. (NC Gaston County Resolution, Nov. 9, 2006). 
261. Gill & Weissman, supra note 231; see UNC IMMIGRATION/HUMAN RIGHTS 
POLICY CLINIC, A LEGAL ADVOCACY GUIDE TO BUILDING INTEGRATED COMMUNITIES 
IN NORTH CAROLINA 88 (2012), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/
clinicalprograms/buildingcommunitiespart2.pdf (the ordinance was rescinded in November 
2011 after community organizing efforts). This is not a complete list of the resolutions, 
ordinances, and statutes proposed or enacted in order to achieve attrition of North Carolina’s 
Latino immigrant population. See Mai Thu Nguyen, Anti-Immigration Ordinances in NC: 
Ramifications for Local Governance and Planning, in CAROLINA PLANNING 32, 36 (2007).  
262. Although the 287(g) program was intended to target and remove undocumented 
immigrants convicted of “violent crimes, human smuggling, gang/organized crime activity, 
sexual-related offenses, narcotics smuggling and money laundering.” However, most of the 
arrests undertaken pursuant to local law enforcement 287(g) authority have been for traffic 
infractions and low level misdemeanors and S-Comm triggered deportations have largely 
resulted from low-level offenses. Partners, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,  
available at http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2014); 
State Immigration Enforcement: Broken Strategies, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS’ 
ASS’N, (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=25667|
47262.    
263. State v. Villeda, 165 N.C. App. 431, 433-34, 599 S.E.2d 62, 64-65 (2004). The 
study was introduced into evidence in the case, where a state trooper admitted to patrolling a 
specific area “for the purpose of looking for Hispanic males,” and asserted that “[e]veryone 
knows that a Hispanic male buying liquor on a Friday or a Saturday night is probably already 
drunk.” Id. 
264. See United States Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment  at 4-6, 
United States v. Johnson, No. 12-cv-1349 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 3, 2014), available at 
http://www.acluofnc.org/files/Alamance_MSJ_3-3-14.pdf (itemizing facts not in dispute). 
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Mexicans when making motorist stops and were trained to “escalate” 
the situation for the purpose of justifying a search.265
The narrative that constructs Mexicans as a threat to be 
contained and expelled by law also asserts itself when Mexicans 
attempt to use the law for their own needs and protection.  They are 
deemed to have misused the law if they invoke legal protections or 
legal rights.266 An anti-immigrant demonstration in North Carolina 
was organized to protest Mexicans who were seeking legal assistance 
from the Mexican consulate which offers services through a mobile 
unit traveling throughout North and South Carolina.267 The protestors 
claimed that these services would enable Mexicans to break the 
law.268 Mexicans who sought legal assistance, they claimed, were 
seeking special privileges. Said one protestor, “It’s not fair, it’s just 
not . . . . We have to do what we have to do as Americans. They’re 
getting everything free, and we have to suffer for it. ”269 Similarly, 
immigrants in Hazelton, Pennsylvania were denounced for seeking 
assistance from the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund (“MALDEF”) to obtain justice for the murder of an 
undocumented Mexican by two white boys: “First of all, MALDEF 
has no right in our legal system. This is our country, not the Spanish 
country. You know what I mean? What right does MALDEF have to 
put their nose in our legal system?”270     
The consequences of exclusionary and restrictionist laws at the 
local level are well-documented. Local immigration enforcement 
initiatives often dissuade immigrants from reporting crimes, thus 
compromising the public safety of all members of the community.271  

265. Troy Williams, A War on America’s Minority Communities: Reflections from a 
Former Drug Copy, RIGHTS WORKING GROUP (July 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/content/war-drugs-a-war-america%E2%80%99s-minority-
communities-reflections-a-former-drug-cop. 
266. Longazel, supra note 202, at 584. 
267. Jennifer Swartz, Protesters Picket Latino Fair, THE DAILY REFLECTOR (Aug. 7, 
2011), http://www.reflector.com/news/protesters-picket-latino-fair-606945#.Tj_5MTwY_pM.
email. 
268. Id.  
269. Id.   
270. Longazel, supra note 202, at 584. He also points out that political actors 
complained about legal services offered in Spanish as unlawful discrimination. Id. at 593. 
271. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & IMMIGRATION & HUMAN RIGHTS 
POLICY CLINIC, THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
LAWS: 287(G) IN NORTH CAROLINA 32-35 (2009), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/
documents/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf; HANNA GILL, THE LATINO MIGRATION 
EXPERIENCE IN NORTH CAROLINA: NEW ROOTS IN THE OLD NORTH STATE 44-45, (2010). 
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Fears that parents will be deported affect the emotional well-being 
and performance of children at school.272 Families live in execrable 
conditions as a result of inattention to housing and landlords who 
threaten to “turn them in” if they complain.273 Law at the local level 
acts as an agent of regional and racialized politics and perpetuates a 
false and harmful narrative about Mexican immigrants. 
III. RE-PRESENTING AND ALTERNATIVE USES; DIVERGENT 
NARRATIVES 
As examined in Part I, foreign policy, federal immigration laws, 
and restrictionist local laws are formulated and justified on the basis 
that Mexican drug-cartels are a national security threat and that 
Mexicans who cross the border arrive to the United States with the 
disposition of dangerous criminals. But it is also true that narratives 
based on the very same discourse of drug violence and criminality are 
used for humanitarian purposes. Moreover, there is evidence of a 
shifting narrative that situates Mexico and Mexicans as praiseworthy 
for their economic productivity that is critical to US global economic 
well-being.   
A. Alternative Uses of the Drug War at our Doorstep: Asylum 
The prevailing narratives that have facilitated the development 
of social and legal policies and practices designed to exclude, 
segregate, and expel Mexicans have also served the needs of 
immigration advocates who seek legal remedy for their clients to 
obtain legal residence in the United States. A number of immigration 
remedies depend upon proof of hardship or threat of harm suffered by 
a claimant if deportation were to ensue.274 In these circumstances, the 
narrative of drug cartel violence serves as a strategy for social 
inclusion rather than exclusion.   

272. GILL, supra note 271, at 48. 
273. Id. at 50. 
274. For example, requests for Asylum, Trafficking Visas, U Visas, Cancellation of 
Removal, Withholding of Removal, Convention Against Torture claims, and Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status, among others, require an immigrant to demonstrate the likelihood 
of harm if she were returned to her home country. 8 U.S.C. §§1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A) 
(asylum); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(T)(i)(IV) (Trafficking visa); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(u)(ii); 
1255(m)(1)(B), 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.24(g)(3), (h)(iv) (U visa); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) 
(Cancellation of Removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (Withholding of Removal); 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.16(b)(1)(i) (Convention Against Torture claims); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii) (Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status). 
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 In recent years, Mexican asylum requests have increased 
substantially. Asylum requests are said to be a relatively new 
phenomenon. From 2012 to 2013, the numbers of asylum claims, 
described as a surge, more than doubled.275 The rise in asylum claims 
has garnered significant media attention.276 Journalists report 
prototypical details of the circumstances of asylum seekers whose 
stories tell of having to flee gruesome violence in Mexico.277 Often 
entire family networks have sought refuge from drug cartels that have 
seized control of their villages and towns with impunity.278 
Newspapers describe in graphic detail the consequences of those who 
do not or cannot comply with the demands of extortionists.279   
Attorneys use various forms of the media to explain the plight of 
their clients. They describe harms their clients have suffered and the 
dangers they face; one attorney disclosed that he has been threatened 
and warned to stop representing Mexican asylum claimants.280  
Immigration lawyers endeavor to educate the public about the 
obstacles Mexicans encounter in presenting relevant facts in the 
context of the nuances of asylum law and the challenges of 
representing their clients before skeptical asylum officers and 

275. Sandra Dibble, Rising Numbers of Mexicans Seek Asylum, SAN DIEGO UNION 
TRIBUNE (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/Mar/12/mexican-asylum-
seekers/3/?#article-copy (reporting some recent evidence that the upward trend is slowing); 
Damien Cave, Servant in Mexico Tests U.S. on Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2013, at A1; 
Brian Skoloff, Southwest Border Sees Surge in Asylum Requests (Aug. 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/southwest-border-sees-surge-in-asylum-
requests/2013/08/17/ec079db0-0768-11e3-88d6-d5795fab4637_story.html; Ted Hesson, What 
Could Happen if Border Asylum Claims Keep Rising, FUSION.NET (Aug. 19, 2013), available 
at http://fusion.net/justice/story/happen-border-asylum-claims-rising-15451. 
276. This Article does not parse the requests in terms of claims made at the border, 
affirmative claims made by Mexicans already present in the United States, or withholding of 
removal claims made after the denial of affirmative asylum claims. See Maria Baldini-
Potermin, 87 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2385 (2010) (thoroughly reviewing the differences with 
regard to claims by Mexicans). 
277. Dibble, supra note 275 (describing an asylum seeker who said his sons had been 
killed and his daughter kidnapped and raped, and a man whose legs were cut off when he 
refused to pay extortionists.). 
278. Id. (telling a family’s story from the state of Guerrero). 
279. Deborah Hastings, Fleeing Wrath of Vicious Cartels, Record-Breaking Numbers of 
Mexicans Seek Political Asylum in U.S., N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/mexicans-fleeing-drug-cartel-mayhem-seek-ing-u-s-
asylum-record-breaking-numbers-article-1.1493183; Molly Hennessy-Fiske, More Mexicans 
Seek Asylum in U.S. As Drug Violence Rises, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2012), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/28/nation/la-na-texas-asylum-20121028/2.  
280.  Hennessey-Fiske, supra note 279. 
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immigration judges.281 Scholarly publications articulate the arguments 
for granting asylum to Mexicans fleeing the drug cartel violence and 
identify flaws in the processes that disproportionately burden such 
claims.282 Practical guides encourage attorneys to undertake 
representation of Mexican asylum seekers.283 Online petitions have 
circulated advocating for “Protection and Legal Relief for Mexican 
Nationals Affected by and Fleeing Violence in Mexico.”284 The 
Washington Office on Latin America has chastised the US 
government for endangering migrants who are returned to Mexico.285 
These undertakings all rely on the master narrative of violence 
associated with Mexico. 
The data reveals that most Mexican asylum claims are rejected 
and at a disproportionate rate relative to other asylum seekers.286 
Moreover, the outcomes are often arbitrary. Some family members 
have been successful while others have been denied although they 
have been subject to the same threats and harm and rely on the same 
evidentiary materials.287 The government insists that these claimants 

281. SARAH CAMPOS & JOAN FRIEDLAND, MEXICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN 
ASYLUM AND CREDIBLE FEAR CLAIMS (May 2014); Baldini-Potermin, supra note 276; 
Jillian Tuck, Mexico Urges U.S. to Facilitate Asylum Claims for Victims of Violence, 
PHYSICIAN’S FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 22, 2014), http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/blog/
mexico-urges-us-to-facilitate-asylum-claims-for-victims-of-violence.html; Jason Dzubow, 
Mexican Asylum Seekers Need Not Apply, ASLYUMIST.COM (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://www.asylumist.com/2013/11/13/mexican-asylum-seekers-need-not-apply/ (quoting an 
attorney setting forth the elements of an asylum claim, the relationship between the cartels and 
the state in the context of asylum claims based on extortion); Dibble, supra note 275 (quoting 
an attorney representing Mexican asylum claimants explaining that asylum officers and judges 
believed her clients were seeking economic benefits but were not refugees). 
282. See generally Whitney Drake, Disparate Treatment: A Comparison of United States 
Immigration Policies Toward Asylum-Seekers and Refugees from Colombia And Mexico, 20 
TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 121 (2014); Benjamin H. Harville, Ensuring Protection or Opening 
the Floodgates?: Refugee Law and its Applications to Those Fleeing Drug Violence in Mexico, 
27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 135 (2012); Jillian N. Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence: A Reason to 
Grant Political Asylum from Mexico and Central America, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 31 
(2012); Sergio Garcia, Asylum for Former Mexican Police Officers Persecuted by the Narcos, 
31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 245 (2011). 
283. Baldini-Potermin, supra note 276. 
284. See Petition for Protection and Legal Relief for Mexican Nationals Affected by and 
Fleeing Violence in Mexico, IPETITIONS, available at http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/
protectionformexicannationals/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).  
285. Clay Boggs, What Happens to Migrants after They Are Deported?, WOLA.ORG 
(May 13, 2013), available at http://www.wola.org/commentary/what_happens_to_migrants_
after_they_are_deported.  
286. Skoloff, supra note 275 (citing DHS’ statements to this effect); Cave, supra note 
275; Dibble, supra note 275; Tuck, supra note 281; Hennessey-Fiske, supra note 279. 
287. Hennessey-Fiske, supra note 279. 
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seek an improvement in their economic circumstances and are 
otherwise not credible asylum applicants.288 Officials raise the specter 
of the “floodgates” and warn that granting asylum to a Mexican 
applicant will result in an outpouring of claims.289 Other political 
actors claim that Mexicans are simply trying to exploit “loopholes” to 
gain access to the United States and refer to them as “narco refugees” 
without legitimate claims.290 Indeed, the Republican chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee expressed concerns that Mexican asylum 
claimants are “criminals [who] are abusing the asylum process, 
cheating their way into the country.”291 Federal officials have 
suggested that violence has quieted down, that the Mexican 
government has gained some control over the cartels, and thus asylum 
is not warranted—an ironic position considering heightened military 
intervention and demands for the sealing of the US-Mexico border.292  
Each asylum claim, of course, is submitted based on the specific 
circumstances of the individual claimant. Many of these cases are 
likely to rely on the narrative of drug-war violence. Petitions 
enumerate facts to support the client’s claims to escape the wrath of 
vicious cartels. A typical submission would include the journalistic 
accounts of the violence with blaring headlines about brutal crime 
from which there is no escape or accountability.293  
 Well-meaning intent notwithstanding, the narrative of 
criminality in asylum cases also contributes to the prevailing 
stereotypes of Mexico and Mexicans. Critical legal theorists have 
long expressed concerns that narratives deployed in asylum cases may 
contribute to cultural essentialism and national stereotypes.294 Makau 

288. Dibble, supra note 275. 
289. Drake, supra note 282, at 144. 
290. Hesson, supra note 275 (quoting Fox news); Hennessey-Fiske, supra note 279. 
291. Cave, supra note 275. 
292. Id. Some speculate that a grant of asylum might serve to pronounce Mexico as a 
“failed state”—something the United States is reluctant to do.  PERRY NAVA, THE CASE FOR 
THE MEXICAN ASYLUM SEEKER FLEEING CARTEL VIOLENCE (2013), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/perry_nava/1. Interestingly, the Mexican government has encouraged 
the United States to grant asylum requests. Id. 
293. See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 276, at 2385-86; Caroline Bettinger-Lopez et al., 
Redefining Human Rights Lawyering Through the Lens of Critical Theory: Lessons for 
Pedagogy and Practice, 18 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 337, 366 (2011) (discussing this 
issue). 
294. See Michelle A.  McKinley, Cultural Culprits, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 
91, 97-99 (2009); Bettinger-Lopez et al., supra note 293, at 355; Jacqueline Bhabha, 
Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and Human Rights, 15 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 155, 162-63 (2002); Leti Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, 
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Matua’s warning about human rights work bears consideration:  
“[T]he human rights movement is marked by a damning metaphor. 
The grand narrative of human rights contains a subtext that depicts an 
epochal contest pitting savages, on the one hand, against victims and 
saviors, on the other.”295   
 This critique, albeit important, has complicated consequences.  
The immediate goal of immigration advocates is to assemble a strong 
case on behalf of clients who generally have a compelling need to 
stay in the United States. One would be hard pressed to argue against 
bringing asylum claims unless prohibited by the criteria set forth by 
the asylum statute itself and/or legal ethical standards. Moreover, this 
critique resonates problematically with immigration adjudicators who 
are already unnecessarily skeptical of asylum claims generally.296   
A more constructive critique would give greater attention to the 
distortions produced more from what is omitted in the asylum 
narrative than what is included. The structure of an asylum claim 
provides little opportunity to set forth the relationship between the 
complex historical determinants of violence and the violence itself.  
That is, due to the constraints of the legal structures within which 
these claims are developed, advocates are likely to omit from asylum 
narratives the historical and structural determinants of Mexico's drug 
war, particularly US policies that contribute to drug violence.297 The 
discourse on crime and drugs moving north de-contextualizes the 
issue of drug violence from conditions associated with the aftermath 
of the Washington Consensus dictates and the United States as 
Mexico’s drug-demand side gun supply-side neighbor.298 That 
NAFTA has produced tens of thousands of displaced workers who 
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Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573 (1996); Isabelle R. 
Gunning, Global Feminism at the Local Level: Criminal and Asylum Laws Regarding Female 
Genital Surgeries, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 45, 61 (1991). See generally Tracy E. Higgins, 
Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1996) 
(critiquing a tendency in human rights work to essentialize cultures, particularly in the realm 
of feminist international work). 
295. Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 
HARV. INT'L L.J. 201 (2001). 
296. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.  
297. See Bettinger-Lopez et al., supra note 293, at 366. 
298. Mercedes González de la Rocha, The Urban Family and Poverty in Latin America, 
22 LATIN AM. PERSP. No. 2, at 12 (1995) (describing the impact of the free trade zones on the 
economies of Mexican urban areas); see Weissman, supra note 100, at 843-45 (describing how 
conditions attached to the use of IMF and World Bank funds, as well as agreements with the 
United States affected the ability of Mexico to carry out its responsibilities to reduce violence). 
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have moved into drug-trade related activities appears to have no 
apparent relevance in these cases.299 The US trade in guns and 
demand for drugs as factors that contribute to drug violence are not 
likely considered relevant to asylum proceedings.300 Similarly, that 
the circumstances of globalization and financial deregulation have 
allowed drug traffickers to move their goods and launder their profits 
with greater ease does not easily fit within the client’s asylum 
petition.301 Indeed, it is difficult to construct a proper means for 
introducing these facts in the context of individual asylum claims. 
The narrative of the Mexican-as-criminal thus reproduces itself 
in asylum claims, both by the asylum advocate seeking to assist the 
claimant who desires to enter or remain in the United States, as well 
as by asylum foes who depict asylum seekers as cheats and 
criminals.302 Advocates must continue to search for ways to address 
the structural issues that contribute to the violence from which their 
clients flee, and to determine whether and how to make these 
concerns relevant to asylum claims.303   

299. Mark Weisbrodt et al., Did NAFTA Help Mexico? An Assessment After Twenty 
Years, CTR. ECON. & POL'Y RESEARCH, at 9 (2014), http://www.cepr.net/documents/nafta-
20-years-2014-02.pdf (measuring higher rates of unemployment since NAFTA among other 
deteriorating economic conditions); Eduardo Zepeda et al., Rethinking Trade Policy for 
Development: Lessons From Mexico Under NAFTA, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L 
PEACE,  at 5 (2009), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta_trade_development.pdf (noting 
how NAFTA contributed to inequality and extreme poverty); Jason Beaubien, As Drug War 
Turns into Quagmire, Fear Rules Mexico, NPR (Aug. 2, 2010, 12:00AM) http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=128804488 (noting that the vast number of unemployed 
facilitates the ease with which cartels recruit “foot soldiers”). 
300. Since 2006, Mexican authorities have confiscated over 60,000 weapons from drug 
cartels purchased from US gun dealers. James V. Grimaldi & Sari Horwitz, Mexican Cartels 
Wielding American Weapons, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2010, at A01; see Katherine Eban, The 
Truth About Fast and Furious, CNN MONEY (June 27, 2012), 
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2012/06/27/fast-and-furious-truth; Katie Soltis, Mexican 
Drug Violence Fueled by U.S. Guns, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.coha.org/mexican-drug-violence-fueled-by-u-s-guns/#more-13110.  
301. Betty Horwitz, The Role of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
(CICAD): Confronting the Problem of Illegal Drugs in the Americas, 52 LATIN AM. POL. SOC. 
139, 140 (2010). 
302. See supra notes 297-301, and accompanying text. 
303. For a good example of how historical circumstances, including European and US 
colonialism, imperialism, and exploitation contribute to exploitation in third world countries, 
see INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY IN HAITI OMNIBUS MOTION TO 
ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE ALL CASES INVOLVING HAITIAN RESPONDENTS (Thomas F. 
Griffin, Principle author), available at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/
2009/12/Model-Motion-to-Stop-Haitian-Deportations.pdf. 
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 B. Divergent Narratives 
 1. Mexico as Economic Partner: Trade, Oil, and Labor 
 i.  A nation “on the rise” 
 In addition to the alternative uses of the discourse of 
criminality, a new narrative has emerged that takes a rhetorical turn 
from the threats posed by Mexico to promote its transformation to a 
regional and global economic power. Since 2013, US officials have 
begun to emphasize the role of Mexico as one of its most important 
economic partners. The “new” Mexico has been described as a nation 
“on the rise;” it is predicted to enjoy even greater economic growth 
and stability.304 In fact, in recent years, Mexico’s rate of economic 
growth has surpassed regions in the world, including the United 
States.305 
 The shift in the discourse has been notable.306 Media attention 
has focused on positive economic improvements in Mexico.307  
Journalists report that the Mexican manufacturing sector is gaining 
on, or has surpassed those in other regions in the world and has 
become especially attractive to international investors.308 Experts 
have praised Mexico’s reforms and have suggested that the country is 
moving toward greater parity with the United States.309 At a recent 
summit on Latin America’s economies, Mexico was described as 
“vital” to the global economic interests of the United States.310 As the 

304. John Marczak, Immigration:  Changing Dynamics and a New Latin America, in 
THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, LATIN AMERICA’S CHANGING ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND POLITICS: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED STATES 29, 30 (2014) [hereinafter LATIN 
AMERICA’S CHANGING ECONOMIES]. 
305. Christopher E. Wilson, A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a 
Competitive Region, in LATIN AMERICA’S CHANGING ECONOMIES, supra note 304, at 5, 9. 
306.  Shear & Archibold, supra note 24. 
307.  One Year after Enrique Peña Nieto’s Election, Has there been a significant shift in 
Mexico’s security strategy?, WOLA.ORG (July 2, 2013), http://www.wola.org/
commentary/one_year_after_enrique_pena_nieto_s_election.  There has also been suggestions 
of a shift in the narrative as a means to attract Latino voters in general, a topic beyond the 
scope of this Article.  
308. Damien Cave, For Migrants, New Land of Opportunity is Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 2013, at A1 (also observing that Mexico has become a favored destination for 
American and European immigrants); Damien Cave, As Ties With China Unravel, U.S. 
Companies Head to Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2014, at A6. 
309. Id.  
310. Shannon O’Neil, Rapporteur’s Summary, in LATIN AMERICA’S CHANGING 
ECONOMIES, supra note 304, at 1. 
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two economies develop deeper dependencies, commentators now 
refer to a US-Mexico global economic partnership.311   
 Mexico’s economic productivity and the increasingly 
important role it plays in trade with the United States have served to 
downplay the Mexican-as-criminal narrative.312 Recently, President 
Obama has moderated his concerns about drug-cartel violence, 
lamenting the fact that “so much of the focus ends up being on 
security” and has called for efforts to “put the old mindsets aside.”313 
One politician suggested the border should be viewed as an 
“opportunity” rather than a “threat,” and that too much emphasis has 
been given to the idea of Mexico as a danger.314 In contrast to 
concerns about a failed state that justify a militarized border, some 
Mexican experts have now proclaimed that Mexico “has developed a 
highly competitive democratic system, and its rising middle class, 
solid macroeconomic footing and positive outlook for economic 
growth make the country a pillar of strength in a complex and volatile 
global environment.”315 President Peña Nieto, who was featured on 
the cover of Time magazine with the caption, “Saving Mexico,”316  
has made clear his intentions to “recalibrate” the US-Mexico 
relationship so that issues related to drug cartel violence no longer 
characterize conditions in Mexico.317    
 Vast oil reserves may account for the recent discursive turn.  
Mexico ranks among the ten largest oil producers in the world, and 

311. Wilson, supra note 305. 
312. Cave, As Ties with China Unravel, supra note 308 (noting that experts and officials 
agree that trade must be just as important as border security). Main, supra note 90.  
313. Main, supra note 90; Shear & Archibold, supra note 24 (describing a “vastly 
different message” coming from President Obama); Carlsen, supra note 22 (quoting the 
President praising Mexico for its ambitious reforms).   
314. A Study in Contrasts: House and Senate Approaches to Border Security: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Border and Maritime Security of the H.R. Comm. Homeland Sec., 
113th Cong. (2013) (statements of Congressman O’Rourke and Jayson Ahern, Comm'r US 
Customs and Border Protection), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
113hhrg86033/html/CHRG-113hhrg86033.htm (noting that Mexico is one of the most 
important trading partners and suggesting that border reform issues should be viewed as trade 
opportunities). 
315. CHRISTOPHER E. WILSON ET AL., NEW IDEAS FOR A NEW ERA: POLICY 
OPTIONS FOR THE NEXT STATE IN U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS 9 (2013). 
316. Saving Mexico, TIME (Feb. 24, 2014), http://content.time.com/time/covers/
pacific/0,16641,20140224,00.html.  
317. Eric L. Olson, The Future of U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, in LATIN 
AMERICA’S CHANGING ECONOMIES, supra note 304, at 17, 21; Shear & Archibold, supra note 
24. 
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among the top three in the Western Hemisphere.318 Since Peña 
Nieto’s election in 2012, he promised broad changes to its energy 
industry, a development that has been of great interest to the United 
States and oil companies.319 In 2013, an oil reform law was passed 
that provided foreign investors access to what was previously a state-
controlled oil sector.320  
 The United States has long had its sights set on Mexico’s 
state-run oil company, PEMEX—or Petróleos Mexicanos, and has 
encouraged its privatization.321 National security documents from as 
far back as the early 1950s have confirmed US intentions to access 
Mexico’s oil reserves and other Latin American “raw materials 
essential to US Security.”322 A number of US oil companies have 
been eager to bid for contracts and joint ventures that will net billions 
of dollars in profit.323 President Obama praised Mexico for its 
privatization of PEMEX.324 US State Department representatives 
visited Mexico to explore ways to develop a strategic partnership 

318. Nancy E. Brune, Energy: Latin America’s Growing Heft in Global Oil Markets, 17 
in LATIN AMERICA’S CHANGING ECONOMIES, supra note 304. On August 12, 2014, Mexico 
signed into law an energy reform bill that allowed for foreign investment and privatization 
schemes with regard to oil. Mexico Signs Energy Reform Into Law Ending a 76yr Monopoly, 
RT.COM (Aug. 12, 2014), http://rt.com/business/179824-mexico-signs-energy-reform-law/  
319. Peter Baker & Elisabeth Malkin, Politics to Shadow Obama’s Trade Talks in 
Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014 at A3. 
320. Brune, supra note 318, at 19. In August 2014, Peña Nieto signed additional laws 
that will further facilitate private companies to profit from Mexico’s oil, gas, and electricity 
industries. See Walter Russell Mead & Staff, Mexico Energy Reforms Signed Into Law 
AMERICANINTEREST.COM (Aug, 13, 2014), http://www.the-american-interest.com/blog/
2014/08/13/mexican-energy-reforms-signed-into-law/. 
321. Laura Carlsen, Mexico's Oil Privatization: Business, FOREIGN POL’Y FOCUS (May 
27, 2014), http://fpif.org/mexicos-oil-privatization-risky-business/.  
322. U.S. Dep’t of State, Department of the Historian, Statement of Policy by the 
National Security Council, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954 Volume IV, The 
American Republics, Document 12, (Sept. 3, 1954), https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d12 (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
323. Zain Shauk & Jim Polson, Mexico Oil Fields Are Boon for Energy Companies as 
Frontier Teeters, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014), http://business.financialpost.com/
2014/08/07/mexico-oil-fields-are-boon-for-energy-companies-as-frontiers-teeter/?__lsa=ea49-
36a6; Juan Pablo Spinetto & Brendan Case, PEMEX CEO Sees First Production Ventures as 
Early as This Year, BLOOMBERG REPORTS (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-01-27/PEMEX-ceo-sees-first-production-ventures-as-early-as-this-year.html 
(noting the Chevron and Shell among others expressed interests); Nick Cunningham, What 
Mexico’s Energy Reform Means for Big Oil, OILPRICE (Aug. 10, 2014), 
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/What-Mexicos-Energy-Reform-Means-for-Big-
Oil.html.    
324. Carlsen, supra note 22 (referring to PEMEX as the “crown jewel” for US oil 
companies and Pentagon planners). 
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concerning energy.325 The office of Congressional Research Service 
confirms the importance of Mexico’s oil and gas production to US 
interests.326 Experts have described the possibility of investment in 
Mexican oil as a “tantalizing prospect.”327 They have suggested that 
Mexico is now in a position to bestow favors upon the United States 
and “provide a boost to the US economy.”328 It is a definitive turn 
from the narrative of Mexico as a failed state. 
Some Mexican specialists have questioned the efficacy of this 
shift, and have suggested that the drug cartel violence continues to 
demand prominence in the discourse.329 Human rights groups fear that 
the change could signal reduced interests in ending impunity and have 
suggested that the new rhetorical turn is a matter of political 
convenience.330 Others argue that the rhetoric, whether it focuses on 
the economy or drug cartel violence, is an effort to reshape and profit 
from Mexico’s economy in furtherance of the goals of US foreign 
policy.331    
Mexican citizens have expressed disbelief at the 
pronouncements that Mexico is a “nation on the rise.”332 As one 
Mexican expert noted: 
Both presidents painted a rose-colored picture of Mexico as an 
up-and-coming middle-class society that utterly ignored the rise 
in poverty and inequality, violence and human right violations. 
The Los Angeles Times coverage of Obama’s speech aimed at 
young people quoted several students smitten by the U.S. 
president but stumped by the distance between the his portrayal 
of their country and their own experience.  According to the 
Times, they wondered out loud, “what country is he talking 
about?”333 
Moreover, many Mexicans oppose the privatization of PEMEX, 
which has triggered concerns about the loss of sovereignty and injury 

325. Id. (quoting a State Department head). 
326. CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R42917, MEXICO’S PENA 
NIETO ADMINISTRATION: PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES IN U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS 
(2013), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/213989.pdf 
327. Duncan Wood, Growing Potential for U.S.-Mexico Energy Cooperation, in LATIN 
AMERICA’S CHANGING ECONOMIES, supra note 304, at 43, 47. 
328. Wilson, supra note 305, at 9. 
329. Olson, supra note 317, at 17. 
330. Shear & Archibold, supra note 24. 
331. Mercille, supra note 89, at 115. 
332. Carlsen, supra note 22. 
333. Id. 
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to national pride.334 Others have expressed concerns that transnational 
oil companies are too powerful for their government to manage and 
control and question who will benefit.335 They have expressed 
concerns about the environmental impact occasioned by privatization, 
the likelihood of layoffs and higher rates of unemployment, and the 
possible violent displacement of populations.336 
 Nor has the new narrative interrupted the flow of funds for the 
“war” against drug cartels or resulted in a shift in legal policy toward 
Mexican immigrants. Opponents of CIR continue to characterize 
Mexicans as criminals and focus on the Mexican role in drug cartels.  
Moral panic has not diminished; many Americans continue to 
disproportionately fear Mexicans compared with other immigrant 
groups.337 
  Mexicans continue to suffer as a result of the ongoing military 
strategy. Human rights groups continue to press for an end to US 
strategies that have “militarized [ ] societies in the name of the ‘war 
on drugs,’” while protesting the prospect of US oil companies in their 
midst.338 The “new” narrative appears to promote a different idea of 
Mexico, but one with questionable benefits for Mexico or Mexicans.  
Nonetheless, the United States has been transparent about its intent 
“to take advantage of this American moment . . . on energy” and to 
“bring countries together”339—something less likely to occur if the 
United States continues to characterize Mexico as a national security 
threat, a lawless country, and its citizens heartless criminals. 

334. Id.; Carlsen, supra note 321; Richard Fausset, Tens of Thousands Protest Mexican 
Oil Reforms, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/08/world/la-fg-
wn-thousands-protest-mexican-oil-reforms-20130908; Manuel Roig-Franzia, For Many 
Control of State-Run Pemex is About National Pride, WASH. POST, April 30, 2008. 
335. Carlsen, supra note 321 (quoting an open letter to Peña Nieto stating that “Oil 
transnationals in the world have as much power as many governments . . .”). 
336. Christopher Sellers, The Environmental Consequences of Privatizing Mexico’s Oil, 
DISSENT MAGAZINE (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/the-
environmental-consequences-of-privatizing-mexicos-oil;  Carlsen, supra note 22. 
337. Scott Clement, The Data on White Anxiety over Hispanic Immigration, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/08/14/the-
data-on-white-anxiety-over-hispanic-immigration/?hpid=z6.  
338. Main, supra note 90; see supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. 
339. Carlsen, supra note 22. 
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 ii Mexican immigrants: productive entrepreneurs and skilled 
workers 
 Yet another shift in the narrative derives from recent field 
work by sociologists and studies by economists who have examined 
the skill level of immigrants in the United States and the value they 
create for our national economy. Mexicans are generally not 
portrayed as high-skilled or inventive workers as are some other 
immigrant groups.340 At best, they are described as less-educated, 
unskilled workers who nonetheless provide economic benefits. 341 On 
occasion, the need for low-skilled farm labor trumps anti-immigration 
sentiment.342 As others have put it, “their main contribution is the 
savings they bring to consumer society in the form of cheaper goods 
and services. In other words, their low wages, and vulnerability, while 
clearly bad for them, is good for us.”343 
 Recent studies, however, suggest that the assessment of 
Mexican labor is skewed. Just as Mexico is now a site of economic 
productivity, some now view Mexicans as highly productive 
immigrants. Advocates have demonstrated that immigrants revitalize 
cities and towns and are credited with reversing population decline, 
reducing crime rates, and have re-established neighborhoods.344  
Various studies describe Mexicans as savvy entrepreneurs who have 

340. Julia Preston, U.S. Plan Aims to Draw Immigrants With Technology Skills, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2014, at A17 (describing proposed reforms to help highly skilled immigrants 
and their families from China, India, and the Philippines); GIOVANNI PERI ET AL., STEM 
WORKERS, H-1B VISAS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN US CITIES, at 59 (2013), available at 
http://www.norface-migration.org/publ_uploads/NDP_09_13.pdf (finding that Mexicans 
receive only 3% of all H-1B high-skilled visas). 
341. See Miguel R. Salazar & Andrew Selee, Facing the Future:  The Changing 
Dynamics of U.S.-Mexico Migration, in LATIN AMERICA’S CHANGING ECONOMIES, supra 
note 304, at  27, 38;  see also Marczak, supra note 304 (referencing Mexican immigrants and 
the US need for low and medium-skilled workers).  
342. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, THE BORDER SECURITY, ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITY, AND IMMIGRATION MODERNIZATION ACT, S.744. (Apr. 22, 2013), 
available at http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=44075&linkid=260652 
(various witnesses testifying on the need for agricultural workers in and in support of 
immigration reform).  
343. Nichola Lowe & Natasha Iskander, Beyond the Wal-Martization of Immigration 
(2011), available at http://isa.unc.edu/latino-migration-project/guest-blog; see Susan Leigh 
Star & Anselm Strauss, Layers of Silence, Arenas of Voice: The Ecology of Visible and 
Invisible Work, 8 COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE NETWORK 9, 15-16 (1999) 
(describing the way those who do domestic work are viewed or “created” as nonpersons). 
344. Paul McDaniel, How Immigration is Key to New York City’s Renaissance, 
IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Apr. 16, 2014), available at http://immigrationimpact.com/
2014/04/16/how-immigration-is-key-to-new-york-citys-renaissance/#sthash.7JLqrDro.dpuf.   
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helped to grow the economy by establishing small businesses.345  
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Mexicans are the 
largest group of immigrants establishing new companies.346 Mexican 
immigrants have been described as the drivers of local economies.347 
 Furthermore, recent empirical studies have demonstrated that 
Mexican immigrants heretofore categorized as less-educated and low-
skilled in fact have significant “technical and social skills and 
competences acquired informally on and off the job.”348 The findings 
reveal that many Mexicans come to the United States with substantial 
and complex competencies and specialized crafts that are then 
transferred to and benefit the US labor market and US building and 
trades industry.349 The studies challenge the way that skills are 
measured and argue that informal skills should not be conflated with 
unskilled.350  
 These studies have broad implications, not only to disrupt the 
narrative of the low-skilled Mexican worker—a description, as 
Leticia Saucedo has noted, that is historically tied to a type of 
masculinity in need of monitoring and regulation—but may shift law 

345. See Michele Waslin, Immigrant Laborers Continue to Strengthen American 
Workforce, Economy, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Sept. 2, 2011), available at 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2011/09/02/immigrant-laborers-continue-to-strengthen-america
n-workforce-economy; Paul McDaniel, More than 600 Businesses Urge Congress to Act on 
Immigration Reform, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Feb. 28, 2014), available at 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/02/28/more-than-600-businesses-urge-congress-to-act-on-
immigration-reform/.  
346. ALEXANDRA STARR, LATINO IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, HOW TO 
CAPITALIZE ON THEIR ECONOMIC POTENTIAL (2012), available at http:/i.cfr.org/
content/publications/.../CFR_WorkingPaper13_Starr.pdf.   
347. FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTE, IMMIGRANT SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS, A 
SIGNIFICANT AND GROWING PART OF THE ECONOMY  2, 26 (2012), available at 
http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/immigrant-small-business-owners-FPI-20120614.pdf; Paul 
McDaniel, From Coast to Coast, Immigrants Drive Local Economies, IMMIGRATION 
IMPACT (Oct. 3, 2013), available at http://immigrationimpact.com/2013/10/08/from-coast-to-
coast-immigrants-drive-local-economies/.  
348. Jacqueline Hagan et al., Identifying and Measuring the Lifelong Human Capital of 
“Unskilled”Migrants in the Mexico-U.S. Migratory Circuit, 2 J. ON MIGRATION AND HUMAN 
SECURITY 76 (2014). 
349. Id. at 87-88; see also Jacqueline Hagan et al., Skills on the Move: Rethinking the 
Relationship Between Human Capital and Immigrant Economic Mobility, 38 WORK AND 
OCCUPATION 149, 150, 161-63 (2011) (noting Mexican expertise in bricklaying, tile-making, 
carpentry, masonry, etc.).  
350. Hagan et al., supra note 348, at 78, 83-84 (observing that skills developed at the 
workplace usually are not recognized in the same way as skills developed in educational 
settings). 
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and legal policies.351 As the authors of the studies point out, at the 
transnational level, findings suggest that Mexico can develop 
programs that recognize and reward return migrants, and help to 
further develop entrepreneurial ventures.352 At the federal level, a 
more accurate assessment of immigrant skills might contribute to 
inclusion of Mexican workers in a different category for purposes of 
employment-based visas and provide them more opportunities for 
legalized status at higher pay commensurate with their abilities.353 As 
the narrative shifts from Mexican-as-criminal to Mexican-as-
craftsman, the greater recognition of skills might contribute to local 
policies that are more inclusionary.   
CONCLUSION 
 Narratives about Mexico function in the realms of social 
circumstances and policy from which they emerge and to whose 
purpose they are given. They serve to obscure other—larger—
questions bearing on the determinants of drug-cartel violence, 
particularly on political-economic factors, including neoliberal trade 
agreements, US drug demand, and US-to-Mexico gun trafficking.  
They serve the economic interests of military contractors and avail 
themselves of the conventional wisdom about Mexico to influence 
political decisions and policies that militarize the drug war. They thus 
inhibit the consideration of policies designed to mitigate structural 
and systemic issues that underlie drug-related violence.354 The use of 
the narrative as political fodder contributes to an environment in 
which a dispassionate discussion of important legal values and 
principles becomes difficult if not impossible.   
 When used for humanitarian purposes, the narrative often fails 
to identify the relationship between politico-economic conditions, on 
the one hand, and drug-cartel violence, on the other, and in its own 
way further contributes to a distorted understanding of circumstances 
in Mexico. It is difficult to ascertain if the rhetorical turn by which 
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351. Saucedo, supra note 100, at 562. 
352. Hagan et al., supra note 348, at 95. 
353. The Immigration Act of 1990 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act, § 203, 
8 U.S.C. § 1153 by creating new subsection INA § 203(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(B), 
and reduced the number of visas for unskilled immigrants are capped at 10,000.  It also created 
a “no spilldown” provision which prevents any increase in the number of immigration visas 
issued to unskilled workers due to unused visas in other categories. Id.  
354. See Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 300.  
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Mexico has been recast as a global economic partner and Mexican 
immigrants have come to be appreciated as economically productive 
and skill savvy workers will counteract the narrative of the Mexican-
as-criminal.  
 Perhaps the most promising developments originate with 
activists on both sides of the border, both Mexican and US citizens, 
who seek to create a movement to reframe the discourse and the 
current policies that result from a militarized response to drug 
violence. Across the hemisphere, activists seek to replace the 
narrative of criminality with the narrative of human rights. They call 
attention to social inequalities, poverty, and healthcare as opposed to 
the war on crime/drugs motif.355 Latin American and global 
commissions have been established to study ways to reform drug 
laws; they have emphasized decriminalization and regulation as the 
most propitious strategies.356 In 2011, Javier Sicilia, the leader of 
Mexico’s Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity, urged 
reforms to address drug-related violence that would, out of necessity, 
challenge the paradigmatic neoliberal economic developments that he 
describes as constituting “the legal form of criminality.”357 The 
movement has created an alliance on both sides of the border as 
groups affected by the war on drugs in Mexico and the United States 
seek common cause.358  
 In the United States, immigrant advocacy groups, such as the 
1996 Blog Committee, organize for justice in all matters relating to 

355. ARIADNA ESTÉVEZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREE TRADE IN MEXICO: A DISCURSIVE 
SOCIOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 62 (2008). 
356. See Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift, LATIN AM. COMM’N ON 
DRUGS & DEMOCRACY (2009), available at http:// www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/
declaracao_ingles_site.pdf (headed by Ernesto Zedillo, the former president of Mexico, and 
the former presidents of Brazil and Colombia—all countries with a history of problems with 
drug cartels seeking an end to the militarization and criminalization strategies); War on 
Drugs: Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG 
POL’Y,  at 5, 15 (2011), available at http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/
themes/gcdp_v1/pdf/Global_Commission_Report_English.pdf (opposing criminalization 
strategies to respond to drug violence as exacerbating the problem). 
357. Fred Rosen, Interview with Javier Sicilia Part II: Reweaving Mexico’s Social 
Fabric, NACLA (Feb. 14, 2012), https://nacla.org/blog/2012/2/14/interview-javier-sicilia-
part-ii-reweaving-mexico%E2%80%99s-social-fabric. 
358. Laura Carlsen, Heart-to-Heart on the Drug War, HUFF. POST (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-carlsen/hearttoheart-on-the-drug-_b_1903718.html 
(describing the Mexican Caravan in the United States and meeting of mothers from both 
countries mourning the loss of family members as a result of the drug wars).  
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crimmigration.359 Together with Families for Freedom, a center for 
families affected by criminalization and deportation,360 and other 
coalition members, advocates seek to promote a new discourse that 
honors the strength and creativity of immigrants to “heal, analyze, 
strategize, force change in unjust laws, and inspire community 
empowerment.”361 They call for an end to any form of discourse that 
promotes the good immigrant/bad immigrant narrative:   
[W]e contest social exclusion and develop the leadership of 
directly affected people in their own liberation. Resisting the 
labels of ‘Illegal Immigrant’ and ‘Criminal Alien’ that posit us as 
an exception to U.S. Civil Rights, FFF assert our common 
humanity by situating our work in a human rights framework.362 
This binational effort to shift the narrative addresses the larger 
context for drug cartel violence and the root causes of migration. 
Rather than maligning Mexicans as a threat to the social order and 
cultural fabric of the United States, a new discourse may help 
restructure public perceptions about Mexican immigrants so that they 
















359. See Welcome to the 1996 Blog!, 1996 BLOG,  http://1996blog.org/
2014/04/10/welcome-to-the-1996-blog/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014) (organizing against 
“deportation, prison, and criminal legal systems”). 
360. See FAMILIES FOR FREEDOM, http://familiesforfreedom.org/ (last visited Oct. 27, 
2014). 
361. Welcome to the 1996 Blog!, supra note 359. 
362.  FAMILIES FOR FREEDOM, supra note 360.  
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